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Europe is currently experiencing the largest migration of people since World War II. 
Research indicates mass migration is unlikely to slow in the coming years given increasing 
effects from push/pull factors of regional conflict, globalization, increasing stratification in 
worldwide societies, and limited natural resources. Individuals resettling in Europe come from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, cultures, religions, and educations, as compared to the 
majority populations residing in European host nations. Social convergence between residents 
of Europe and newly established migrants in this environment become a friction point for 
potential conflict and societal unrest. European social and economic stability is crucial to the 
United States given that many of the nations are key allies and members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Migrant integration strategies vary within Europe. The 
most widely used models in practice in Europe for migrant integration are assimilation and 
multiculturalism. The purpose of the thesis is to understand how European migrant integration 
efforts are experienced by immigrants, why some migrant integration models are more 
successful than others, and ultimately what key drivers are required for sustained social and 
economic stability. The goal of this examination is to understand what was done well, what 
was not done well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current and future 
migrant integration efforts in Europe. Integration is experienced at the local level and in the 
context of native environments. For this reason, a comparative case study was conducted to 
analyze European migrant integration strategy effectiveness in Paris, France (assimilationist 
approach) and Stuttgart, Germany (multiculturalist approach). The context and environment of 
the two case studies are distinctly different - France being defined by its colonial legacy, while 
Germany is defined by its federalist model post-World War II. The strategies of the two 
vii 
locations additionally conform to separate tactics evidenced wherein Stuttgart takes a systemic 
approach (cradle to grave), while Paris is disparate or altogether hands off. Factors of analysis 
and areas of research for the two case studies within the investigation include: identity, policy, 
economics, and education. The research demonstrates six key drivers contribute to successful 
migrant integration: policy model (integration/multiculturalism); equal rights and religious 
protections mandated by law; strategic integration policy (comprehensive at national to local 


















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER          PAGE 
I. INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND BACKGROUND  1 
Introduction        1 
Research Question       3 
Key Questions        3 
Relevance to the Intelligence Community     4 
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge     4 
Research Methodology        5 
Background: current Crisis Migration      11 
Post-World War II Migration History in Brief     16 
Islamophobia: The Case for Integration     20 
Stages of Development (Chapter Organization)    24 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW       26 
Introduction         26 
Process and Trends of Migrations     28  
Historical Differences between France and Germany   40 
Integration Strategies       45 





III. MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN PARIS, FRANCE    57 
Introduction         57 
Parisian Identity         61 
Segregated Populations       62 
Discrimination in the guise of Secularism    64 
Resurgent Muslim Culture at risk to Radicalization   69 
Migration Integration Policy Efforts in Paris     72 
The Economics of the Banlieue       76 
Education: Migrants into Frenchmen     78 
Concluding Remarks        85 
 
IV. MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN STUTTGART, GERMANY  90 
Introduction        90 
Identity Influences in Stuttgart       96 
Sustainable and Diverse Communities    97 
Reducing Inequality through Equal Rights and Dialogue   100 
Islamic Identity        105 
Preventing Migrant Radicalization      110 
Migrant Integration Policy Efforts in Stuttgart     112 
The Economics of Mass Migration     118 
Education Drives Integration       123 
Concluding Remarks        131 
 
x 
V. A NEW ENVIRONMENT: FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION    
Introduction         137 
Comparing Factors of Identity       138 
Preventing Residential Segregation     138 
Access to Equal Rights to Reduce Discrimination    141 
Islamic Identity in France and Germany     142 
Deterring Radicalization       144 
Comparing Migrant Integration Policy    146 
Comparing Factors of Economics in Migrant Integration  148 
Education as Acculturation       151 
A Framework for Successful Migrant Integration    152 
 

















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE                                                                                                                             PAGE 
 
1. Figure 2.1: Body of Knowledge Relative to Migrant Integration in Europe with  
Emphasis in the Countries of France and Germany  27 
 
2. Figure 2.2: Variation in Migrant Integration Strategies   47 
 
3. Figure 3.1: Children’s Educational Attainment by Parents’101 Religion 85 
 
 
4. Table 4.1: Unemployment among Non-Germans and Turks (1980 - 1994) in %                102 
 
5. Table 4.2: Unemployment Rates (Average) for Total Population and Foreigners by  
Highest Populated Cities and Regions (2015 – 2016) in %                                                   122 
 















INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND BACKGROUND 
Europe is currently experiencing the largest migration of people since 
World War II. In 2015 alone, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) received 1,721,706 asylum applications lodged within the 
38 countries of Europe.1 Although this number pales in comparison to the 13 
million displaced persons (DPs) present in Europe in the summer of 1945, it 
provides context to both the magnitude and differences to the current crisis.2 
One key difference stands out with the potential to change the make-up of 
modem Europe. The European 21st century mass migration does not consist of 
majority ethnic Europeans, as in post-World War II, rather the majority of 
refugees and migrants come from the Middle East, North Africa, and other 
peripheral areas that are unstable and prone to conflict.3 
Looking closer at the 2015 UNHCR estimate reveals several factors 
relevant to the aspect of identity in the spheres of politics and economics, both 
having far reaching ramifications to the future prosperity of Europe. The 
majority of the 2015 migrating populations originated primarily from the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions - 83 percent in fact for a total 
of 1,421,147.4 Further analysis reveals that Syrian refugees fleeing the civil 
                                                             
1 “Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015),” UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed 
January 22, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/fMZIBr.  
2 William J. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945 
To The Present (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 16. 
3 Diana Kay, “The Resettlement of Displaced Person in Europe, 1946-1951,” in The Cambridge 
Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1995), 154. 
4 “Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015): MENA,” UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, 
2 
war contributed 42 percent of this amount for a total of 591,471 asylum 
applications. 5  The numbers illustrate that individuals resettling in Europe 
come from different socio-economic backgrounds, cultures, religions, and 
educations, as compared to the majority of the population residing in European 
host nations. 
Migration is fast becoming the defining topic of twenty-first century 
Europe. Voluntary or involuntary movement of people is one key outcome 
from a multitude of factors, yet importantly it is also separate. Migration is a 
nexus point in the modem-era culminating from the drivers of globalization, 
increasing stratification in worldwide societies, limited natural resources, and 
push/pull factors moving people across borders. The intersection between 
established people and those newly arrived, is a point of concentration in which 
potential conflict occurs, and requires mitigation through applied migrant 
integration strategies. 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the way European migrant 
integration efforts are experienced by non-state citizens, why some migrant 
integration models are more successful than others, and ultimately what key 
drivers are required for sustained social and economic stability. Integration is 
experienced at the local level and in the context of native environments. For 
this reason, a comparative case study between the two locations of Stuttgart, 
Germany and Paris, France is undertaken to analyze European integration 
                                                             
accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/4BGrmN.  
5 “Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2015): Syria,” UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, 
accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly/lSNtME.  
3 
strategy effectiveness at a local level and in the context of two distinctly 
different native environments - France being defined by its colonial legacy, 
while Germany is defined by its federalist model post-World War II. The goal 
of this examination is to understand what was done well, what was not done 
well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current and future 
migrant integration efforts in Europe. 
Research Question 
What lessons can be learned from past European immigration strategies that 
contribute to successful integration of current and future migrant resettlement 
in Europe? 
Key Questions 
1. What is the risk of non-integration of newly arrived crisis migrant 
populations in Europe? 
2. What historical differences exist between France and Germany that 
associate to different migrant integration approaches undertaken? 
3. Why was one nation state more successful than the other in integrating 
migrants to its native population? 
4. What key drivers most contribute to successful integration between existing 
communities and newly settled refugees? 
Relevance to the Intelligence Community 
European social stability is of key importance to the United States and 
the American Intelligence Community (IC). Nation states within the European 
Union are crucial allies of the United States in addition to many also being 
4 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Socially 
cohesive, economically solvent, and stable European nations result in stronger 
international alliances. Principal long-term risks of migrant non-integration 
include violence and terrorism resulting from stratification of society, 
associated costs to a state’s economy in responding to the aforementioned 
issues, and scarce security resources being redirected for domestic purposes. 
Study of these aspects deepen IC understanding of the issues and inform 
decisions. 
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
The field of migrant integration is in relative infancy with less attention 
paid to it than other associative aspects such as refugee asylum, origins of crisis 
migration, immigration policy, and paths to citizenship. While models of 
integration such as assimilation and multiculturalism are well documented and 
studied in reference to the larger citizenship policies of the host country, the 
process of migrant integration itself is less studied, particularly at the local 
level worldwide. Specific to the European Union, the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX 2015) is one rare non-governmental source that is 
recent and relevant to the area of research; it also reflects the growing interest 
in policy fields to better understand best practices for integrating migrants in 
the future.6 The shortfall to MIPEX 2015, and other less substantive texts, is 
that nothing specifically addresses migrant integration at the lower levels of 
                                                             
6 Thomas Huddleston et al., Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (Barcelona/Brussels: CIDOB and 
MPG, 2015), accessed February 13, 2015, http://ww.mipex.eu.  
5 
society such as in cities or towns. The local level of society is where migrants 
live and seek to join the social order. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by 
offering a study of the characteristics of two migrant integration models at the 
local levels of Paris and Stuttgart; neither of which are well documented or 
studied in any singular comprehensive context. 
Research Methodology 
The thesis scope and general starting point for understanding is to first 
analyze the two most widely used models in practice in Europe for migrant 
integration - assimilation and multiculturalism. Within that paradigm, this 
thesis analyzes and compares these two different approaches to migrant 
integration through an in depth study of the two separate and distinct locations 
of Paris, France (assimilation approach) and Stuttgart, Germany 
(multiculturalist approach). The migrant integration strategies of the two 
locations additionally conform to separate tactics evidenced wherein Stuttgart 
takes a systemic approach (cradle to grave), while Paris is disparate or 
altogether hands off. The individual studies are lastly bounded each within the 
time period of post-World War II through the present-day. 
Why Paris in France and why Stuttgart in Germany? The basic structure 
of both countries share similarities. They both reside in the heart of Europe 
geographically. Besides the United Kingdom (ranked fifth world-wide), 
Germany (ranked fourth world- wide) and France (ranked sixth world-wide) 
are the largest economies in Europe by GDP.7 Their standards of living are 
                                                             
7 2014 World Bank country ranking by GDP (millions of US dollars): United Kingdom (2,988,893), 
6 
similar; GDP per head respectively as $36,070 in France and $39,640 in 
Germany. 8  Outside of the United Kingdom, Germany and France are the 
largest population centers within modern Europe respectively at 81.4 and 64.7 
million people each.9 In sum, the resources and capacities of both countries are 
roughly equivalent. 
The core is where the differences are found. These include differences 
in the areas of culture, history, politics, and government structure. World War 
II dramatically shaped Europe of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Germany lost World War II and in the aftermath forfeited all colonial 
possessions. The Marshall Plan helped rehabilitate and remodel German 
government in the American image - that being a decentralized federalist 
system.10  France on the other hand was on the winning side and as such 
remained a major colonial power. Furthermore, its government structure as a 
republic remained largely unchanged with power emanating from centralized 
control in Paris.11 
The two countries’ histories separately informed their policy and social 
approaches to immigration. France’s legacy of colonialism - in combination 
with its formalized structure of secularism (called laïcité) - strongly influenced 
                                                             
Germany (3,868,291), France (2,829,192). “GDP Ranking - Data,” World Bank, December 29, 2015, 
accessed January 26, 2017, http://daa.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.  
8 Economist: The World in 2016, Countries: The World in numbers, November 2, 2016, 118. 
9 Ibid. 
10 William J. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe. 30-35 
11 Marcus Engler, “Country Profile: France,” Focus Migration no. 2 (March 2007): 1 -8, 
Accessed January 12, 2017, http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/country-profiles.1349.0.html?&L=1.  
7 
its position towards assimilating migrants into society.12 The thought process 
came from the standpoint that anyone, anywhere, could become French, no 
matter the color of his or her skin, religion, or background. Germans on the 
other hand took a multiculturalist approach modeled after the American system 
(from the Marshall Plan), yet also influenced by a strong sense of German 
tradition and post-war guilt.13 This is why immigration policy was constructed 
either as temporary - in the case of the guest-worker programs of the twentieth 
century – or alternatively tied to German language and cultural proficiency as 
evidenced in paths to citizenship in use until reform and implementation of the 
Immigration Act on January 15, 2005.14 
Many past immigration policy studies looked at all these factors at the 
national level. A few more looked at migrant integration, but only at the 
national level, and normally contrasted between the United States and either 
France, Germany, or the United Kingdom in varying combinations. 
Interestingly from the research conducted, no academic study on migrant 
integration at the local (city) level has been undertaken solely for two or more 
European cities. This study seeks to change that. Human experiences and 
learning are local, not national. Policy is implemented from the top-down, but 
the mobilization and feedback stem from the people whom are affected the 
                                                             
12 Marcus Engler, “Country Profile: France,” William McGurn, “Europe’s Feckless Secularism,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-feckless-secularism-1453767637.  
13 William J. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 30-35. 
14 Veysel Ozcan, “Country Profile: Germany,” Focus Migration no. 1 (May 2007): 1 -9, 
accessed January 12, 2017, http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/country-profiles.1349.0.html?&L=1.  
8 
most, which drives change from the bottom-up.15 Additionally, a strength of 
utilizing a case study approach at the local level means it is controlled. Not in 
the exact sense that it is a double-blind study, but specifically that the context 
of analysis consists of a similar environment, people, and politics; as compared 
to having the range of various locales at the national level. 
Paris is a population center of more than two million people (1999 census 
of 2,125,246) where 40 percent of the residents are immigrants, and another 14 
percent are foreigners.16 France by law does not allow compiling of census 
statistics by race or ethnicity; rather the classifications of migrants to France 
are recorded as either immigrants or foreigners.17 Under this policy immigrants 
are those individuals born abroad, but having attained French citizenship.18 
Foreigners in contrast - regardless of nationality - are defined as those not 
having French citizenship.19 It is estimated that roughly 15 percent of the total 
population of Paris are Muslims.20 The predominance of Muslims ethnically of 
MENA origins resides in the banlieues (suburbs) ringing Paris. Paris, as a city, 
does not have an official policy targeting migrant integration, but rather the 
stance is to defer to the central measures of the French government.21 In this 
                                                             
15 Rinus Penninx, “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,” Migration 
Policy Institute, October l, 2003, accessed December 29, 2016, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4810.  
16 “Demographics: a cosmopolitan city;” Paris, accessed January 27, 2017, 
http://next.paris.fr/english/presentation-of-the-city/demongraphics-a-cosmopolitan-
city/rub_8125_stand_29896_port_18748; Marcus Engler, “Country Profile: France,” 4.  
17 Marcus Engler, “Country Profile: France,” 3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” Washington 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 29.  
21 Marcus Angler, “Country Profile: France,” 5. 
9 
context for example, the unrest in the banlieues in the autumn of 2005 was not 
addressed until final passing of the Law of Equal Opportunities on 31 March 
2006.22 
Germany and Stuttgart’s statistics are more clear-cut and transparent. 
Stuttgart’s City Council estimates 40 percent of the city’s total population of 
593,923 were born abroad collectively representing “over 170 nations and 
speak[ing] over 120 languages.”23 Much like Paris, this makes Stuttgart “one 
of the largest proportions of migrants among German cities.” 24  Stuttgart 
recognizes its negative birth rate and demographic challenges. As such it 
welcomes all immigrants because without them “only 10 percent of households 
in Stuttgart would include children.”25 Industry within Stuttgart is the major 
driver in drawing migrants in to augment the work forces for companies as 
diverse as “Daimler Chrysler, Porsche, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM.26 To this 
end the city crafted the policy of The Pact for Integration, which combines 
“leadership with community involvement to create equal opportunity and 
inclusive, productive communities.”27 Supporting this endeavor are resources, 
funds, and the city’s own “Office of Integration Policy.”28 
An acknowledged weakness of utilizing case studies at the local level 
                                                             
22 Ibid. 
23 Stuttgart City Council, “The Stuttgart Pact for Integration: The Power of Planning,” Cities of 








are that they are isolated samplings that may not be applicable elsewhere or at 
the nation state level.  The rebuttal to this is to utilize factors of analysis that 
are rigid enough to be universally applicable, but also flexible enough for 
application in different settings and context. The factors of analysis and areas 
of research for the two case studies within this investigation include: identity, 
policy, economics, and education. These four particular factors are important 
because they cover most, if not all, aspects of the socio-economic environment 
that modern people reside in. 
The four factors of analysis are broad in order to be applicable to the 
relevant study within the different contexts of either Paris or Stuttgart. 
Specifically, though, there are differing sub-areas within each factor. Identity 
includes the sub-areas of segregation, discrimination, religion, and 
radicalization. Policy includes the sub-areas of citizenship, access to social 
programs, and policy approaches (e.g. assimilation, multicultural). Economics 
includes the sub-areas of employment, demography, and state (or local 
government) capacity. Lastly, education includes the aspects of social 
mobility, education and training as drivers of integration, and how education 
facilitates other factor areas. These are all areas to be studied within each 
location of Paris and Stuttgart. 
The linkage between the factors and the context is also critically 
important. For example, incubators of radicalization in France may generally 
derive more from the influence of prisons and relevant populations, rather than 
in Germany where parallel society mosques may be more an incubator towards 
11 
radical Islamist tendencies.29 Critical to this example is conducting relevant 
analysis within the same lenses in order to capture lessons learned. 
Background: Current Crisis Migration 
A modern nation state does not simply have just one type of migrant; 
rather it has all forms simultaneously creating handicaps on policy and host 
nation response.30 This challenges the state’s effectiveness when responding to 
a variety of different types of migrants in language, ethnicity, and condition. 
Additionally, globalization in the modern era accelerates and deepens the 
impact of migration through worldwide communications to, from, and between 
crisis migrant origins and potential host nations. This is the reason why surges 
in numbers correspond in real time to breaking news, impending policy 
changes, or from unorthodox information flows via social media. 
The modern era’s trend is that crisis migrant numbers are neither slowing 
nor stabilizing; rather the magnitude and velocity of the issue is growing 
proportionally to the instability of the MENA region. The Middle East in 
particular continues to be unstable with the Syrian conflict now claiming an 
estimated 200,000 - 330,000 lives total.31 Correspondingly, 2015 saw a growth 
of immigrant numbers by 40 percent (total of 1,721,706 applications), when 
                                                             
29 Hendrik M. Vroom, Dialogue with Islam: Facing the Challenge of Muslim Integration in France, 
Netherlands, Germany (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2010), 1-43, www.thinkingeurope.eu.  
30 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World (New York: Guilford Press, 1993), 8. 
31 Micah Zenko, “Counting Dead in Syria: In considering, possible responses to the bloodletting, what 
matters is not just how many are dying, but how,” The Atlantic (September 15, 2015): 1, accessed 
January 23, 2017, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/syria-civil-war-civilian-
deaths/405496.  
12 
compared with only 695,275 UNHCR asylum applications in 2014.32 This is 
not an anomaly considering that the spike in 2015 alone equaled roughly the 
cumulative numbers from 2011 to 2014.33 
These numbers pale in comparison to the startling future potential sizes 
of the issue. There are 29,378,005 persons of concern in MENA countries that 
could potentially migrate in the near future.34 Of this figure, 11,525,069 are of 
Syrian origin.35 Syria traditionally is a country of emigration with a culture of 
working abroad in Lebanon, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Turkey, and 
elsewhere. 36 It is not a stretch of imagination, in the geopolitical sense, that 
more persons of concern continue seeking refuge from war if already 
historically inclined to emigrating. 
Author Susan F. Martin defines crisis migration in the introductory 
chapter of Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and 
Responses where crisis as a term evolved in being more accurately inclusionary 
in nature, as compared to previous exclusionary terms of “voluntary” and 
                                                             
32 ‘Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2014),” UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, accessed 
January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/tIkVvs; “Asylum Seekers 
(Monthly Data 2015),” UNHCR Population Statistics. 
33 “Asylum Seekers (Monthly Data 2011- 2014),” UNHCR Population Statistics, January 6, 2016, 
accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_montly/hq3q8T.  
34 UNHCR classifies persons of concern as: refugees (incl. refugee-like situations), asylum- seekers 
(pending cases), returned refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned IDPs, stateless 
persons, others of concern. “Persons of Concern (2014): MENA,” UNHCR Population Statistics, 
accessed January 23, 2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern_wgLDE0.  
35 “Persons of Concern (2014): Syria Origin,” UNHCR Population Statistics, accessed January 23, 
2017, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern/81MDUr.  
36 Peter Seeberg, “Migration into and from Syria and Nontraditional Security Issues in the MENA 
Region: Transnational Integration, Security, and National Interests,” in Migration, Security, and 
Citizenship in the Middle East: New Perspectives, ed. Peter Seeberg and Zaid Eyadat (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 167-93. 
 
13 
“forced”.37 The migration of people can be viewed as one common response 
from an event that forces action - i.e. push/pull factors. The movement of 
people in this crisis manner takes many forms - evacuation, makeshift overland 
ventures, or smuggling by illicit trade routes or means. 
Syria is one major push factor to modern mass migration; others include 
a continuing war in Iraq against ISIS, continued conflict between Turkey and 
Kurdish militants, the war in Yemen, the war in Afghanistan, and the usual 
myriad of conflicts between the Sahel and Somalia areas in North Africa.38 
Russia entering the war is another factor; its involvement is likely only to make 
things worse, rather than better, as evidenced by high collateral damage and 
civilian casualty rates not seen since the Chechnya War. 39  Yet Europe 
continues to pull these people to it; to do otherwise is a “breach of the 1951 
UN refugee convention, and of European Law.”40 The only thing standing 
geographically between these potential 30 million MENA migrants and Europe 
is the Maghreb to the west, Turkey and the Balkans in the middle, the Caucuses 
to the east, and the Mediterranean Ocean and Black Sea to the north. 
Above the fray are the longer-term demographic patterns in which 
Europe needs concern itself to remain prosperous and one of the leading pillars 
of a multipolar world in the 21st century. By 2030, the world’s population is 
                                                             
37 Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor, “Setting the Scene,” in 
Humanitarian (Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses (Milton Park: Routledge, 
2014), 8. 
38 Anton La Guardia, “Wave after wave: Why the migrants keep coming,” Economist: The World in 




estimated to grow to 8.3 billion people. 41  Europe is not growing though. 
Europe’s negative replacement birth rates puts it in the position of probable 
“decline in economic productivity and slower aggregate GDP growth” due to 
the shift in median ages beyond 45 years.42 The challenge to Europe is how to 
increase the birthrate enough to escape a “low fertility rap” in order to drive 
economy and finance social welfare programs for the whole of society.43 One 
ready explanation to bridge the gap - and another pull factor -is immigration. 
The National Intelligence Council anticipates cross-border migration to remain 
strong in 2030 due to “globalization, disparate age structures across richer and 
poorer countries, income inequalities across religions and countries, and the 
presence of migrant networks linking sending and receiving countries.”44 The 
biggest driver of this potentiality is not actually refugees in the Syrian case, but 
rather those seeking economic opportunity and a better life.45 The number of 
potential future economic migrants is harder to quantify, but based on these 
factors much greater than the estimated 30 million persons of concern. 
Author Robert Kaplan views geography - and the histories thereof - as 
critically important in this context of push and pull factors of migration. The 
European Union (EU), and its attempts to integrate historically disparate 
                                                             
41 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington D.C.: 
National Intelligence Council, 2012), 20, accessed January 23, 2017, 
http://ww.dni.gov/index.php/about/orginazation/global-trends-2030.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Steven Philip Kramer, “Baby Gap: How to Boost Birthrates and Avoid Demographic Decline,” 




sovereign nations, is analogous in some ways to the divisions present in 
Europe’s Carolingian Empire in the ninth century under the rule of Emperor 
Charlemagne.46 The Holy Roman Emperor ruled core areas of the empire - in 
the modern equivalent - from the North Sea to the Low Countries and beyond 
to Frankfurt, Paris, and Milan.47 The weaker and more unruly states beyond 
this core were those bordering the Mediterranean to include the Iberian 
Peninsula, southern Italy, the Balkans, and Greece.48 A divide existed then and 
still exists now. This is evidenced in the ongoing Euro crisis pitting the richer 
north imposing EU integration, fiscal austerity, and unrepresentative 
bureaucracy against a poorer south.49 It should be no surprise that in response 
these same southern and border areas see surges in nationalism from the myriad 
of issues facing Europe today, ranging from persistent economic stagnation, 
security concerns, and refugee asylum and immigration. 
The modern and united Europe came about through a historical irony. 
European ideals, socialism, and right of refuge to the asylum seeker only 
became reality in the twentieth century because of a geographical wall imposed 
by the Soviet Union and MENA region dictators - all who kept their people 
contained and in order.50 The twenty-first century is increasingly absent the 
                                                             
46 Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe’s New Medieval Map: As the European Union Unravels, the Continent 




49 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Euro Crisis and US Strategy,” Survival 54, no. 6 (November 30, 2012): 
7-28; Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe’s New Medieval Map,” Wall Street Journal, January 16-17, 2016. 
50 Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe’s New Medieval Map” Wall Street Journal, January 16-17, 2016; Heinz 
Fassman and Rainer Munz, “European East-West Migration, 1945-1992” in The Cambridge Survey 
16 
regimes of “Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Assad Family in Syria, and 
Muhammar Qaddafi in Libya.51 With nothing holding the hordes back, the 
Balkans resume its historic role in the region as a natural corridor between 
Eurasia and Africa. 
Post-World War II Migration History in Brief 
The landscape of Europe in the aftermath of World War II left millions 
wandering across a devastated landscape. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the 
Soviet Union collectively deported 14 million Germans in the years following 
the Nazi defeat.52 The rise of the Iron Curtain redrew the international borders 
of Europe and in doing so displaced even more people. The 1951 United 
Nations mandated Geneva Conference sought to address some of these issues 
concerning displaced persons through the Refugee Convention. 53  First it 
committed country signatories to accepting vast numbers of refugees if 
individuals applying for asylum could prove a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted.”54 Initially only Europeans had the right to asylum, but in 1967 a 
new protocol came into effect with worldwide scope and application.55 Today 
the Refugee Convention is ratified by 147 country signatories, which include 
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essentially every major country in the world from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe.56 
The key aspect to the UN Refugee Convention - and which is legally 
interpreted differently among the various signatories - is that only refugees are 
granted asylum.57 Determining who is, or is not, a refugee is ultimately decided 
by the sovereign nation-granting asylum. To Europeans’ credit, the average 
acceptance of refugee asylum applications in the current crisis is “94 percent 
of Syrian migrants ... along with the vast majority of Eritreans, Afghans, and 
Iraqis.”58 Exceptions to this abound, however, with Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and even Nordic countries (Sweden excepted) either 
outright rejecting applicants they view as “economic migrants” or alternatively 
pushing them along to a neighboring country.59 The top five nations accepting 
total asylum applications in 2014 respectively included: Germany, Sweden, 
Italy, Switzerland, and France.60 Germany and France being the two largest 
economies and populations within this cohort and thus the focus of discussion 
herein. 
The aftermath of World War II culminated in an estimated 40 million 
deaths on the European continent and complete destruction of all major 
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infrastructures.61  These two aspects resulted in manpower required for the 
resultant reconstruction effort. The French and German earlier experience with 
contract workers of the 1930’s (post World War I boom) sought cheap labor 
that could be exploited and then deported if no longer necessary.62 This earlier 
knowledge defined the tactics and techniques utilized by both the French and 
Germans in the European ‘guest-worker’ programs utilized from 
implementation in the 1950’s to culmination in the recession plagued oil 
embargo years of the 1970’s.63  
France, Germany, and much the rest of Europe recruited guest workers 
with the understanding that laborers resided only temporarily in the country 
while working; they could not become citizens, were not expected to socially 
integrate into society, and were expected to be repatriated when work was 
complete.64 The reality, however, is much different, which became apparent by 
the 1980 to 1990 timeframe. By 1990, 2,057,810 African (majority former 
colony citizens) and Turkish individuals and families resided in France. 65 
Three years later by 1993, 1,854,945 Turkish citizens resided in Germany, with 
only 762,775 of them registered as guest workers.66 Long-term labor needs of 
government translated into lengths of stay extended, families brought over, 
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migratory flows established, and eventually “permanent settlement and 
establishment of ethnic minorities” residing as second-class citizens in 
ghettoized suburbs ringing the major industrial cities.” 67  Of these the 
predominant ethnic minorities consisted of Turks in Germany and Algerians in 
France; both minority groups tended to be “disadvantaged and socially 
isolated” because their lack of citizenship rights and tenuous legal position in 
the host countries.68 
This refutes the supposed tradition of Europe as countries of emigration, 
not immigration.69 Though the economic recession of 1974 - 1975 effectively 
stopped large-scale recruitment of guest workers throughout Europe, the 1980s 
and 1990s still experienced net illegal immigration to Europe by migrants 
drawn to the strong economies and possibility to apply for asylum after 
arrival.70 European officials still hoped workers would return to their country 
of origin, but after 40 years it was too late. Guest workers had put down roots; 
their children - even their grandchildren -had no connection to their ancestral 
homes, yet they were also not integrated to the society they lived in.71 
Islamophobia: The Case for Integration 
In this environment racism flourished; primarily against ethnic 
minorities, but also from minorities to the supposed oppressors. This became 
                                                             
67 Stephen Castles, “Contract Labour Migration,” 514. 
68 Ibid, 514. 
69 John Van Oudenaren, Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union, 2nd ed. (Lanham: 




apparent when the European Union declared 1997 as the “Year against 
Racism” and established the European Monitoring Center on Racism and 
Xenophobia (now FRA).72 This assertion attested to two factors. First, that 
racism is a large enough issue in Europe to warrant creation of a new EU 
agency. Second, and in a more positive manner, the creation of FRA laid the 
framework for individual sovereign nations to address policy at the EU 
supranational level. 
The way racism existed varied by location and by influence of the model 
of immigration for the given nation or local region. In France, secular law made 
it illegal to gather statistics by race or religion; this in turn made it difficult to 
prove discrimination.73 Furthermore, the French immigration model is of a 
“republican tradition that sought to forge the people in to one united, 
homogeneous, and patriotic nation ... [where] multiculturalism is anathema to 
the French state.”74 A model in essence designed to assimilate immigrants into 
being wholly French, no matter their individual backgrounds, religions, or 
culture. Despite the high ideals of the system, Algerians and other North 
Africans settling in Paris during and after the Algerian War found themselves 
relegated to the outskirts of the city.75 Here they lived in slums, shantytowns, 
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and by the late 1960’s, rebuilt -but much scorned - HLM (habitation a foyer 
modere) housing projects.76 Migrant families - predominantly North African, 
Algerian, and Muslim - converged in these areas geographically separated from 
the rest of Paris and France by “religion, class, customs, and appearance from 
their French hosts. “77 
Germany resisted in a different manner by continued refusal to see itself 
as a country of immigration, which in turn made it difficult for Turks and other 
minorities to gain citizenship and full legal rights.78 By the 1980’s, 60 percent 
of ‘ethnic minorities’ had been born and raised in Germany.79 The German law 
of jus sangunis, or law of the blood, applied wherein German nationality could 
easily be gained by those with enough ‘Germaness’; namely by proof of 
ethnicity though “cultural, linguistic, and hereditary definition of...German 
Kullur.”80 Therefore, an ethnic German residing his whole life in Russia had 
more right to German citizenship than a Turk born, raised, and residing in 
Germany. The law did not change until 1999 when a revision finally allowed 
for children born in Germany to become automatic German citizens as long as 
one parent had also been born in Germany.81 
The historical context of racism towards MENA minorities in Germany 
and France started out generally directed at second-class guest workers due to 
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leave at the end of their visas, but in modernity the issue focalizes through the 
lens of Muslim faith. The “European-Islamic nexus” is a point of intersection 
where a lack of migrant integration is apparent and produces the by-products 
of minority riots in Paris suburbs, individuals becoming radicalized to Islamist 
terrorist groups, and a rise in sovereign nationalism with accompanying shifts 
of politics to the populist right.82 Correspondingly, the identity of European 
Muslims is also changing. No longer are they the temporary guest workers of 
the 1950’s to 1980’s. Now they are citizens and part of the fabric of Europe-
albeit still disadvantaged by predominantly residing in segregated poor ghettos, 
lacking gainful employment, having poor education, and increasingly 
identifying more as Muslim than German, French, or European.83 
In this atmosphere the second and third generations of migrants question 
more than their parents did of assimilating into secular European societies.84 
Many of these generations see the scenario presented from governments as 
demanding “total immersion into European society,” but fear that by doing so 
strips them of their Islamic faith.85 The discontented intergenerational Muslims 
are citizens in name, but not in identity by culture or sociality -”they reject 
minority status to which their parents acquiesced.”86 
Seen from another angle, the rising Muslim population transcends mere 
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immigration issues and now challenges “domestic social unity.”87 Europeans’ 
perceived threat from Muslims is characterized by “security (terrorism) and 
economics jobs),” but the real issue is actually the threat to identity and 
“European way of life.” 88  Each side is unwilling to compromise, but the 
process of integration is a “bilateral relationship, in which the host society must 
negotiate a consensus respectful of the fundaments of the minority’s way of 
life.” 89  It is not a ‘clash of civilizations’ as Samuel Huntington’s thesis 
proposes as culture being at the root of future conflict, rather it is a clash of 
“lifestyles, gender, equality, and sexuality.”90 In plain terms, MENA Muslim 
migrants - and those already settled in Europe - are socially more conservative 
in terms of “abortion, homosexuality, gender equality, and divorce” than liberal 
western Europeans.91 Possible compromise may lie less in the assimilation 
sphere of influence and more in the realm of multicultural societies preserving 
their disparate ethnic identities.92 
At the policy level, the two opposing views are evident in the discourse 
of European politics, which shift back and forth on migrant integration being 
either a tool for minority rights, or adversely pandering to nationalist sentiment 
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by “emphasizing the need for immigrants to accept dominant cultural norms 
and beliefs” in the host country.93 German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a 
poignant example of this flip-flopping in policy by stating in 2010 that “the 
approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to 
enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed.”94 Yet only five years later in 2015 
Chancellor Merkel is the staunchest supporter of migrant rights, asylum, and 
integration in Europe as stated to the European Parliament on October 7th as 
“[w]e must not fall prey to nationalist sentiments in these moments ...It is 
precisely now that we need more Europe, not less.”95 Chancellor Merkel’s 
comments attest to not only there being uncertainty to the German way ahead, 
but moreover debate in how to forge integrated and pluralistic European 
societies. 
Stages of Development (Chapter Organization) 
Chapter two examines the methodological factors of analysis in identity, 
policy, economics, and education through a literature review and background 
information applicable to Europe and the countries of France and Germany. 
Background information at the nation state level is intended to provide baseline 
information to the reader for context and understanding related to the case 
studies in chapters three and four. The objective of the chapter is for the reader 
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to come away understanding the larger influencing issues surrounding the 
research question. 
Chapter three builds on the previous work with a case study analysis of 
Paris’ migrant integration strategy post World War II (1945) to the present. 
Paris represents a model seeking to assimilate migrants into society. Migrant 
origins are of the Middle East and North Africa region with a majority 
population of Algerians. The case study focuses on MENA migrants and 
subsequent generations’ integration experience. The objective of the chapter is 
to better understand the Paris migrant integration effort through the factors of 
analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education. 
Chapter four is a case study on Stuttgart’s migrant integration strategy 
post-World War II (1945) to the present, but with particular attention paid to 
the ‘guest-worker’ and subsequent generations’ experience. Stuttgart utilizes a 
multiculturalism model to integrate migrants into German society. Migrant 
origins are of the Middle East and North Africa region with a majority 
population of Turks. The case study focuses on MENA migrants’ integration 
experience. The objective of the chapter is to better understand the Stuttgart 
migrant integration effort through the factors of analysis of identity, policy, 
economics, and education. 
Chapter five presents conclusions from the previous chapters’ analysis. 
The chapter revisits the relevant factors of analysis in chapter two and identifies 
key drivers and associative lessons learned. The objective of the chapter is to 
use lessons learned and key drivers in order to build an analytical framework 
26 























Migrant integration in the European context - or anywhere worldwide 
for that matter - must be viewed within the larger field of migration studies to 
be understood and analyzed. The field of migration studies is broad, complex, 
and as changing as the subject matter. A literature review with these caveats in 
mind is an ambitious endeavor, but useful for relating relevant seminal studies 
back to the thesis’ methodology and research question. The intent of this effort 
is three-fold. First, the thesis sought inputs from the body of knowledge - e.g. 
literature, case studies, government policy, and statistics - in order to validate 
that the thesis’ research question adds value to the body of knowledge. Second, 
that the existing literature confirms the effectiveness of the key questions 
within a case study methodological approach. Third, that the literature review 
corroborates the thesis’ factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and 
education as an effective tool of analysis for determining key drivers to 
successful migrant integration strategy tactics and techniques. 
Stating that the body of knowledge relevant to migrant integration is 
large and varied is an understatement. As figure 2.1 below relates, migrant 
integration is connected to other areas of study as varied as multiculturalism in 
theory ranging to international refugee law. For this reason, the literature 
reviewed in the following pages relative to the research question organizes the 
important works into three themes: process and trends of migration, historical 
differences between France and Germany, an integration strategies.  
28 
Figure 2.1: Body of Knowledge Relative to Migrant Integration in Europe with 
Emphasis in the Countries of France and Germany.96 
 
Process and Trends of Migration 
An introduction to the field of migration studies is best evidenced by authors Stephen 
Castle and Mark J. Miller in The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the 
Modern World who crafted the groundbreaking work in the modem era on the topic of 
contemporary international migration. The text covers the full range of pressing topics in the 
field of migration - from legal migration, to unwanted migration, to the dichotomy between 
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migration and ethnic diversity. Specifically, the text notes six key areas of migration 
tendency.97  
First is the globalization of migration as a trend of increasing worldwide areas and 
nation states affected.98 Second, the acceleration of migration, which stated simply is the 
movement of people as growing in volume and velocity; thus implying any governance 
response must also accelerate.99 Third, the differentiation of migration; wherein a nation state 
does not simply have just one type of migrant - be it legal, illegal, or refugee - but rather has 
all forms simultaneously creating a handicap on policy or host nation response.100 Fourth, the 
feminization of migration, where women play increasing roles in areas previously reserved for 
men.101 Fifth, the growing politicization of migration where domestic politics are now under 
pressure from international migration and origin nation issues; all requiring greater 
international cooperation between migrant origin countries and those receiving.102 Lastly, the 
proliferation of migration transition where traditional emigrating nations become instead those 
acting as transit migrant areas or transitioning into immigration nations.103 This text is one’s 
introduction to the field of migration and gives an excellent overview of the key issues and 
trends in the modern era. As relative to this thesis though, The Age of Migration gives context 
to the environmental factors that are pushing and pulling people to migrate in modernity. 
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Building upon the foundation of contemporary international migration, crisis is at the 
origin. Author Susan F. Martin defines this subject as ‘crisis migration’ in the introductory 
chapter of Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences, and Responses, where 
crisis as a term evolved in being more accurately inclusionary in nature, as compared to 
previous exclusionary terms of “voluntary” and “forced”.104 The migration of people can be 
viewed as one common response from an event that forces action. The movement of people in 
this crisis-type manner takes many forms - be it through established evacuation, makeshift 
overland ventures, or smuggling by illicit trade routes or means. Finally, crisis migration is 
evolving with emerging effects evidenced from climate change and limited natural resources 
as key drivers. Martin directly proportions crisis immigration within these aspects to the same 
foundational aspects as previously mentioned in The Age of Migration, wherein globalization, 
acceleration, and differentiation are present in crisis migration flows.105 
In short, Martin’s use and range of the term crisis migration is wholly inclusionary 
rather than singularly exclusionary. She defines the term in three ways. First, displacement as 
a category includes those individuals either “affected” or “threatened” by some type of crisis 
outside their control that compels them to move. 106  Next, the category of anticipatory 
movement applies where individuals are compelled to move by anticipating future threats 
outside their control. Lastly, relocation for trapped populations is exactly as it sounds - the 
relocation of people who cannot do so for themselves due to health, safety, finance, or other 
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security reasons. 107  The modern century highlights these challenges as being not one 
dimensional, but rather multi- dimensional. Martin in this manner approaches the origins of 
migration in the same fashion and offers a definition useful in being both flexible and 
applicable to the modern era. 
Crisis and economic migration in the Middle East and North Africa region is 
characterized in the modern-day within the context of push/pull factors from the Arab Spring, 
Syrian Civil War, the Libyan conflict, the Islamist terrorist group Islamic State of the Levant 
(ISIL), and general insecurity from the various regimes and nation states in the region. Authors 
Philip Marfleet and Adam Hanieh in their chapter “Migration and ‘Crisis’ in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region” suggest that conflict, instability, and economic attainment from 
these aforementioned aspects do not provide a full picture. Rather there are three inter-
connected historical factors involved that drive migration as not forced, but rather through a 
history construct relocation of social practice.108 Marfleet and Hanieh assert of this social 
practice through evidence from first a “legacy of European colonialism and its abrupt re-
ordering of the region into nation-states”; second by “imperial and neo-imperial powers” with 
vested interests in energy resources driving the movement of people through incentivized labor 
policies; and third, the modem era’s “politico-military interventions” displacing people 
through crisis, armed conflict, and economic insecurity.109 In short, these three aspects socially 
‘normalize’ the modem migration of MENA populations to Europe, which then induces a 
response from European states in the form of security concerns and border control. 
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Migration elicits state responses in the forms of internal and external security. 110 
Author Elspeth Guild in her influential text Security and Migration in the 21st Century narrows 
this broad field down to four central premises for analysis, which include: state or national 
security aspects including a nation state’s imperative to establish borders and who is allowed 
to cross; the aspect of “security, policing, and crime... and how it relates to a foreigner”; third, 
being security categorization and identity, to include “the state’s power to define the identity 
of its citizens and thereby exclude others who are not accepted as such”; and lastly “welfare 
and social security [for] the allocation of resources to protect the individual.”111 This text 
serves as an introduction to security and migration at the theoretical level with applied case 
studies in the European context. 
Other texts useful on the topic of migration and border security are Katy Long’s chapter 
“Imagined threats, manufactured crises and ‘real’ emergencies” in Crisis and Migration: 
Critical Perspectives as well as Julien Jeandesboz and Polly Pallister-Wilkins chapter of 
“Crisis, enforcement and control at EU borders” in the same book.112 Both these chapters offer 
useful case studies for the securitization of migration flows. All three previous texts are useful 
to this research effort in gaining greater understanding of the structural confines in European 
sovereign nations’ approach to security regarding migration, while also including alternative 
viewpoints from that of the migrant. Critical to this is evidence of the intended, or unintended, 
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consequences of migration security policies which can result in migrants denied entry at 
borders due to migrant classification, incarceration and/or repatriation, exploitation by criminal 
enterprises, and radicalization resulting in risks from terrorism internal or external to the state. 
Migrants allowed entry to other sovereign nations – be it for legal forms of immigration 
or as a refugee, or otherwise illegally as an economic migrant – next concern themselves with 
settling and reestablishing their communities and lives. Resettlement is a useful term to 
encompass the breadth of accommodating migrants of planned (immigration, emigration) and 
unplanned crisis immigration movements. Twenty-first century definitions need to be 
expanded from the older static models of “process planned directly by government or private 
developers for a displaced population” to more modern flexible responses given globalization’s 
accelerating effects on the expanding scope of migrating populations.113 Authors Anthony 
Oliver-Smith and Alex de Sherbinin present an excellent overview on the theory and evolution 
of migrant resettlement in their chapter “Something Old and Something New: Resettlement in 
the Twenty-First Century.”114 
Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin otherwise distinguish between two types of migrants of 
resettlement of development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR) and disaster-
induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR).115 They present two useful frameworks to 
explain the expected behavior of migrants during displacement and resettlement, as well as the 
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adverse effects of the overall process.116 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin demonstrate that DFDR 
and DIDR are more impactful in the modern era with larger numbers displaced due to 
environmental changes and conflict rather than the former natural disasters and urban 
development projects; resettlement in this manner becomes less managed and more ad hoc in 
nature.117 The authors propose that a point of concentration increasingly resides in resettlement 
successes being undermined by the long-term “warehousing [of] affected populations in 
‘temporary’ or otherwise permanent camps (rural slums), or the dispersal of affected 
populations to poverty stricken slums.”118 
Conflict arising during resettlement is the next progression in study and is normally 
called ‘immigrant conflict’ though this term can encapsulate more than the just those 
individuals immigrating legally. The formative work in this area relative to Europe is Rafaela 
M. Dancygier’s work Immigration and Conflict in Europe. The book’s central purpose seeks 
to explain why immigration conflict occurs. Dancygier organizes the book to first explain the 
relative theories and then applies them to case studies at the local level primarily in the United 
Kingdom, but also Germany and France.119 A unique element to this work is that the author 
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hypothesizes that both forms of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict principally 
reside in the “context of local economic scarcity, when immigrants and natives compete for 
goods whose supply is relatively fixed in the short term.”120  This is caveated though by 
Dancygier also stating that “identity-based differences between immigrants and natives are 
[not] inconsequential in the social realm or even the political arena.”121 Dancygier positions 
the case studies at the local level and states, they “must be attuned to the local dynamics that 
shape these conflict patterns.”122 Moreover Dancygier places emphasis in two other key areas 
of interest. First, observations and data indicate generally higher levels of conflict exhibited by 
post-colonial migrants in Britain and France as compared to guest workers in Germany due to 
“policies that guided guest-worker migration ...which reduced the likelihood of competition 
over economic goods.”123 Second, Dancygier also sees housing as a critical aspect to reduce 
immigrant conflict (and to lesser extent other social services of education and health care) as 
the access and quality of housing are most critically tied to economic welfare.124 
The literature focused on trends in migration also demonstrates the impact of cultural 
history and religion to the process of integration. In relation to France, Eugen Weber’s 
Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870 – 1914 and Maustafa 
Kikec’s Badlands of the Republic: Space, Politics, and Urban Policy provide a case study 
analysis of French evolutionary history from that of a decentralized state and citizenry to that 
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of a singular French identity following the revolution through the early twentieth century.125 
Education drove French cultural integration as an acculturation forcing function, whereby 
schools became socializing agents to the goal of “one people, one country, one government, 
one nation, one fatherland” under the Third Republic.126 Weber’s analysis in short presents 
evidence of a centrally planned government process to the goal of national unity through 
cultural assimilation. 
Contrasted to this historical account of French cultural evolution, Mustafa Dikec 
presents the social repercussions of French singular “common culture and identity” through 
the embodiment of the French suburb or banlieue.127 The French traditional republic is that of 
being ‘one and indivisible,’ yet the modern interpretation of the French banlieue “designates 
the social housing estates of popular neighborhoods in the peripheral areas of the cities as 
threats to security, social order and peace ... [and] furthermore, has become closely associated 
with the populations living in banlieues, often defined in ‘ethnic’ terms.”128 Thus, despite Third 
Republican idealism, Dikec suggests that if one is not socially included or assimilated in these 
urban spaces, then they are excluded, which in turn can incubate by-products of racism and 
radicalization. 
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Relative to Germany, David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky edit the pivotal work of 
Turkish Culture in German Society Today, which is in the same trend of thought as Weber and 
Dikec on the matter of inclusion and exclusion in German culture and identity. Though 
somewhat dated, the text presents several contemporary centralized themes that still resonate. 
The first principle being that historic and modern German immigration and migrant inclusion 
are based on sound economic factors where “recruitment and utilization of labor matches 
employers’ demand and market forces.”129 The second principle the author asserts is that of 
ensuring that “migrants remain excluded from civic society, temporary in their status and 
without claims to citizenship or other forms of equality.”130 The text dates from 1996, so this 
second principle is more nuanced in the modern context, but still somewhat accurate today. 
Temporary (predominantly Turkish) migrants were historically recruited by Germany for 
economic reasons, but were then also deliberately excluded from German society because they 
were never intended to stay – they were supposed to go home after the work was done.131 This 
mentality and segregation from the start created handicaps to any eventual social integration 
of these individuals or successive generations.132 Against the backdrop of these factors the 
authors seek to explore the (then) emerging identities of second and third generation German-
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Turks who are caught between two distinct cultures and are increasingly forging a third and 
distinct multicultural identity.133 
Religious observance, experience, and application in daily life are based as much in 
context as one’s identity. A good entry point to understanding the European Muslim experience 
is that of the older creative work by Jorgen S. Nielsen of Muslims in Western Europe published 
in 1992. The account is somewhat encyclopedic in nature, but as such lays out noteworthy 
historical foundations in the understanding of modern Western European Islam as continuity 
to the previous three phases of Muslim cultural expansion on the continent.134 Of particular 
interest to this thesis, Nielsen notes that Germany possessed strong historical ties by the latter 
nineteenth century to the Islamic Ottoman Empire, which then continued into an economic 
symbiotic relationship post-World War II with Turkey; conversely France was the beneficiary 
of large labor migration from colonial possessions in Algeria and North Africa from the 
nineteenth century onwards.135 To generalize, this work can be looked at in analyzing the pre-
1990s lesser globalized version of Islam in Europe, or alternatively as the first immigrant 
generation’s interpretation and practice of being Muslim in Europe.  
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Successive (second and third generations post-World War II respectively) generations 
change and adapt to the environment around them. Beyond the immediate setting of France or 
Germany, the modern Turk or Algerian in Europe is increasingly inter-connected to the rest of 
the world through the effects of globalization. Author Oliver Roy authors the seminal text of 
Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah on “the way in which the relationship of 
Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalization, westernization, and the impact of living as a 
minority.”136 The defining characteristic that shapes modern Islam in Europe – and elsewhere 
to some extent – is that neofundamentalism is gaining traction in the “rootless Muslim youth” 
of second and third generations in the west, which in a minority of the populations breeds 
radicalization, rejection of state and social integration, and prioritization of constructing a 
“universal Muslim community, or ummah.137 
Xenophobic attitudes towards minorities and Muslims are not a new phenomenon in 
Europe. William I. Hitchcock devotes an entire chapter to the subject of racism in his landmark 
work The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945-2002.138 
Hitchcock uses vignettes of Turks in Germany attacked and sometimes killed by nationalist 
radicals in the early 1990’s, Algerians in France marginalized by French Republican laws from 
the 1950s to present, and corroborates these incidents by data from (then) European Union 
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Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (now FRA).139 FRA’s most recent summary 
report Fundamental Rights: challenges and achievements in 2014 confirms this by noting that 
“xenophobia and racist violence targeted at migrants and refugees persists across the union” 
with incidents of racist crime occurring across the European Union in 2014.140 
It should come as no surprise then that some individuals in this type of environment 
feel ostracized from the rest of society and become radicalized towards Islamist forms of 
terrorism. The process of radicalization itself varies with no clear indication of the specific 
criteria that need to occur for one to become ‘radicalized’ and as consequence a danger to 
society. At the theoretical level Eric Hoffer’s work The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature 
of Mass Movements is a good entry point to the subject; other worthwhile studies include the 
recent work by Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Bohmelt on the question “Does Immigration Induce 
Terrorism?”141 Finally, the Congressional Research Service report “Islamist Extremism in 
Europe” provides a more specific overview to policy approaches to counter radicalization and 
terrorism in Europe with targets directed at incubators of terrorism such as mosques, jails, and 
parallel society spaces.142 
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Historical Differences between France and Germany 
History informs and influences understanding of migrant integration in Europe. France 
and Germany are distinct in their histories, yet both share the overarching similarity of 
importing labor post-World War II in order to meet economic needs. Conversely dissimilarities 
abound ranging from France maintaining colonial interests in the aftermath of the war, while 
Germany was remade in the federalist model of American through the Marshall Plan 
undertaken by General Lucius D. Clay.143 Within the larger environment of Europe are the 
similar aspects where economics drive the need for large-scale immigration, while individual 
national history and culture inform policy. The decisive points for analysis in this logic are 
aspects correlating to the fields of policy and economics. 
At the broadest level, Europe experienced migrations throughout its history compared 
to the rest of the world. In this manner, author Dirk Hoerder writes a definitive account of 
Europe’s migration history in context of the rest of the world in his conclusive text Cultures in 
Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium. As he explains, people at the 
fundamental level need a reason to uproot themselves and leave an area – whether because of 
“economic practices, social structures... [or] power relationships.”144 In general, the pressures 
within Europe up until the early twentieth century were such that the region was one of 
emigration, rather than immigration. Where the nineteenth century was defined by being a 
“proletariat mass migration” out of Europe, the twentieth century of post-World War II became 
the “century of refugees” defined by movement either out of Europe or across borders; 1945 
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for example exhibited an estimated 30 million refugees to be repatriated after another 25-30 
million Europeans perished during the course of the conflict.145 For Germany and France, and 
much the rest of Western Europe, this resulted in a manpower shortage to drive post-war 
reconstruction and industry in the following years. 
The latter part of the twentieth century saw migration into Europe accelerate principally 
from four sources: migrants originating from “Euro-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
migration” influences; labor migration; crisis migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers; and 
those induced to migration by nation state coercion.146  Relative to this thesis, these four 
categories align to France and Germany principally within the first two forms with emphasis 
on labor migration consisting of low-priced low skill workers. As to the first form, France’s 
migrant labor pool originated from principally former North African colonies - predominantly 
Algeria – with streamlined transport and access to the ‘mother country’.147 
Germany alternatively adhered to the second form predominantly with labor needs 
organized by directly recruiting semi-skilled ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) through 
established bilateral agreements with “Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, 
Portugal in 1964, and finally Yugoslavia in 1968.”148  Policy design regarding the ‘guest 
workers’ of the 1950s to 1970s intended for these temporary immigrants to only remain in 
country for as long as the work required, yet by the 1970s with migrants well established, 
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policy designs had been superseded by “transnational migration networks, chain migrations, 
and family reunification.”149 The majority of these ‘guest workers’ were Turks, with a total 
population of 1,854,945 individuals (total actual ‘Gastarbeiter’ population of 762,775) residing 
in Germany by 1993.150  The ‘guest workers’ were intended only as temporary and were 
supposed to go home at the end of their individual contracts, though that did not occur for a 
multitude of reasons. Informative texts within the literature of this genre include the definitive 
Migration in European History by Klaus J. Bade and Robin Cohen’s compilation of leading 
authors of The Cambridge Survey of World Migration.151 
The third and most incessant modern form of migration is that of the crisis migrant, 
refugee, or asylum-seeker following forced displacement. As the earlier section on crisis 
migration outlined, the forms of crisis are expanding from aspects of only armed conflict to 
increasingly a myriad of reasons ranging from climate change, scarcity of resources, or food 
shortages from reduced agricultural output. 152  UNHCR highlighted this aspect in their 
authoritative and recurring text The State of The Worlds Refugees 2012 by noting that “global 
forced displacement reached a 16-year high in 2011.”153 
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A fourth and less understood form of migration occurs when it is coerced; being where 
populations are displaced purposely for political purpose or gain on behalf of the nation state 
or authoritarian regime. Kelly M. Greenhill wrote the text on this entitled Weapons of Mass 
Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Migration in this sense is 
emerging as a new form of coercive influence and smart power to employ in the realm of 
international relations and geopolitics.154 
This is the point in which history begins to intersect with that of economy and as such 
bears impact on policy formation. Wholly in the economics sphere, one useful text in 
quantifying the cost of migration flows is the similarly named The Socio-Economic Impact of 
Migration Flows: Effects on Trade, Remittances, Output, and the Labor Market from editing 
team Andres Artal-Tur, Giovanni Peri, and Francisco Requena-Silvente.155  A much more 
useful text for the purposes of this thesis though is that of West European Immigration and 
Immigrant Policy in the New Century edited by key author in the field of refugees and 
migration Anthony M. Messina. Specific chapters range from demography to social inclusion 
policy such as David A. Coleman’s Mass Migration to Europe: Demographic Salvation, 
Essential Labor or Unwanted Foreigners to Barbara Schrnitter Heisler’s New and Old 
Immigrant Minorities in Germany: The Challenge of Incorporation.156 
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For the purposes of this thesis the theme to come away with from this essential text is 
that though Europe historically, and currently, grapples with accepting migrants into their 
countries, the fact remains that due to low birth rates Europe needs immigrants to supplement 
their own declining populations. The case for immigration as demographic supplementation 
rests on two key tenets. First, immigration is a net contributor to population growth with the 
intent of “guaranteeing future domestic customers ... [and] avert[ing] labor shortages”; and 
second, immigration can stop population decline and ensure solvency of social welfare 
systems.157 The key principle left unsaid is that sovereign nations ideally only want the right 
skilled migrants immigrating.158 In closing, Anthony Messina outlines five policy challenges 
that come as a by-product to this enterprise: the challenge of unwanted immigration, the 
challenge of preserving national sovereignty, the challenge of contested immigration policy in 
the domestic sphere, the challenge from the political far right, and the challenge of immigrant 
incorporation.159 
The final section to cover within this theme is that of the general European area and 
European Union (EU) policy and law. Covering the full gambit of applicable laws governing 
migration policy pertinent to both France and Germany - let alone laws of the European Union 
- is well outside the scope and space of this literature review, but one useful text for starting is 
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John Van Oudenaren’s Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union. The text is 
generally informative on the major policy developments within the larger European Union; 
however, this is critical to also understanding individual sovereign nation laws regarding cross-
border movements, immigration, and integration as they share responsibility with the 
overarching EU laws and treaties, or are increasingly crafted in the same image.160 
For specificity, the European Commission’s website on integration is the most 
comprehensive and up to date reference in this regard with the European Union’s mandate to 
promote integration derived from the Treaties of the European Union, the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights, the European Council Multiannual Programmes and the Europe 2020 
Strategy.161 Another informative resource for information and support regarding immigration 
integration to European Union sovereign nation policy makers is the European Commission 
(EC) chartered European Migration Network (EMN), which is chaired by the EC and consists 
of one representative from all EU member nations and observers from the European 
Parliament.162 Finally, it needs to be noted that despite European Commission policy studies 
being salient and well intentioned, it does not mean by default that they are then enforceable 
or readily adopted by individual member states of the European Union.163 
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Mainstream academic consensus holds that for integration to occur successfully in any 
policy model it is certain that at least the two key factors be present: first a legal process for 
immigrants to become citizens and second concerning the “host country’s self-image as a 
multicultural society.164 For the former, paths to citizenship separate who is entitled to the 
benefits of society, while the latter can be seen broadly as the “legitimacy ... in the eyes of the 
host people make[ing] the difference between smooth integration and social tension in 
multiethnic societies.165 Intrinsically, the context and forms of application technique in migrant 
integration matter to the ultimate success of the endeavor and usually revolve around education 
and training as drivers of integration. Therefore, this section is organized within three separate 
sub-sections of first general theory, then theoretical approaches within the context of state 
policy intent, and lastly a brief discussion on case studies pertinent to French and German 
integration strategies. 
Michelle Hale Williams edits a modern scholarly analysis of host nation responses to 
migration and case study application of migrant integration. The Multicultural Dilemma: 
Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation is composed of separate essays on topics 
ranging from migration theory and geopolitics, to factors of ethnic identity, to nation state 
responses, and associated policy. Assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism are not 
identical in theory or application. Assimilation implies homogeneity like a melting pot, while 
integration is one of many parts like vinaigrette - they blend and separate seamlessly. 
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Comparatively, multicultural societies preserve the disparate ethnic identities, but with equal 
rights.166 
The latter part of the twentieth century has seen a trend towards favoring models of 
multiculturalism as compared to assimilationist models, but post-2010 to the modem day, 
nationalist movements in western countries are putting pressure to backpedal on many of these 
policies.167  Germany and France in this way are two distinct types. As figure 2.2 below 
illustrates, Germany was traditionally a model of differential exclusionist (ethnically 
excluding, rather than actually assimilating) due to its legacy of jus sanguinis, but began 
moving towards first integration, and then full multiculturalism in the wake of trying to 
integrate its large population of ‘temporary guest workers’ who decided to stay permanently 
post 1970.168 France on the other hand has historically been assimilationist in outlook and 
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Factors Assimilation Integration Multiculturalism 
Model High Medium Low to None 
Degree of 
Exclusivity 
High Medium Low to None 
Strategy Social Homogeneity Legalistic 
Incorporation 
Social Heterogeneity 



















USA (post 1930s), 
Germany (post 2004); 
Trending to 
 
Figure 2.2 Variations in Migrant Integration Strategies. For simplicity, differential exclusionists 
are included within the assimilation section. Note though that by model definition, differential 
exclusionist ethnically exclude migrants, rather than actually assimilating them. 
Assimilation and multiculturalism models are the primary topic studied in this literature 
review as they pertain best to those utilized in France and Germany. Introductions to both 
models include articles from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) of “Assimilation Models, 
Old and New: Explaining a Long-Term Process” and “Integration: The Role of Communities, 
Institutions, and the State.”170 In examining assimilation models, the literature captures three 
general theories: the classic and new assimilation models, racial/ethnic disadvantage model, 
and the segmented assimilation model. The classic theory is a “straight-line convergence, 
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becoming more similar over time in norms, values, behaviors” while the new assimilation 
model “stress the “incorporation of immigrant groups... by mainstream population.”171 The 
racial/ethnic disadvantage model instead takes an opposing view and argues that different 
language and cultural norms do not lead to further assimilation because “lingering 
discrimination and institutional barriers to employment ... block complete assimilation.”172 
Lastly, the segmented-assimilation model combines aspects of both the former models to argue 
rather that physical barriers such as low quality urban schools present obstacles in reduced 
access to employment and other opportunities and ultimately lead to “stagnant or downward 
mobility” of immigrants or those disadvantaged. 173  Segmented assimilation theory is 
considered the most useful and relevant of the three theories as it takes into account the 
“contextual, structural, and cultural factors that separate successful assimilation from 
unsuccessful… [and] identify such factors in the case of the second generation” who are 
particularly vulnerable to alternately becoming more assimilated or adversely more 
oppositional to the rest of society.174  
If assimilation is generally defined by being a process of socialization in some manner, 
then models of multiculturalism could be best described as long-term, multi- leveled, and 
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institutionally enabled. 175  Long-term denotes that over time the individual migrant and 
successive generations are better integrated than previous. 176 At the societal structural (macro) 
level there needs to be openness and support in an anti-discriminatory environment. 177 
Openness means for migrants to have access to the general institutions of society (housing, 
education and training, health care, etc.), while support is policies that facilitate the 
participation of the migrant such as through language, orientation, and training courses.178 
Ethnic communities are the next (meso) level down and bridge the migrants’ previous 
community to the current through “kinship, migrant cultural regional associations, religious 
communities, political organizations, informal ethnic networks, ethnic media and an ethnic 
economy.”179 Finally at the local (micro) level, it is ultimately dependent on the individual 
migrant to determine their own success as relative to their own motivations and personal 
capacity. 180  The modern multiculturalism model in short, and in theory, is top down 
structurally enabled, but also bottom-up mobilized for freedom of individual success.181 
In addition to the theoretical research, scholars have studied which model works best 
in practice. A 2012 policy brief by Vit Novotny from the Centre for European Studies (CES) 
analyzed factors of economic immigration, asylum, illegal immigration, integration, and policy 
design in the European Union.182 Novotny concluded on the subject of integration that there is 
                                                             
175 Friedrich Heckmann, Integration: What Makes It Work? (Wiesbaden: Europaisches forum fur 
migrationsstudien (efins), 2015), 1-8, accessed February 9, 2017, 
http://www.efms.unibamberg.de/pubpap)e.htm. For a general overview of this process, please see: 
Rinus Pennix, “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,” Migration Policy 
Institute, October 1, 2003, accessed January 23, 2017, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4810.  
176 Heckmann, Integration: What Makes It Work? 
177 Ibid, 2. 
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid, 7. 
181 Pennix, “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,” 
182 Vit Novotny, “Policy Brief.” in Opening the Door? Immigration and Integration in the European 
52 
need for migrant equal access to social and civic rights, but also noting that there is equal 
importance to the host society retaining its own cultural identity.183 Some adaptation on part 
of the migrant is necessary to successful integration simply to be able to communicate and 
interact effectively in the host society’s customs; equating to cultural assimilation.184 The work 
then delves into an analysis through the factors of “success of integration, economic policy, 
employment, education, citizenship, political participation, and the Islamic religion.”185 The 
work in short recommends an integration strategy trending on the side of multiculturalism with 
similar facets analyzed to this thesis. 
Looking specifically at case study application to the given nation states of France and 
Germany first requires knowledge of the overarching laws and policies governing migrant 
integration in order to gauge national intent and any obvious constraints. Generally speaking, 
French Fifth Republic laws are carry-over modern interpretations of previous republics with 
roots firmly planted in the French revolution. French law is characterized as centrally 
organized and disseminated with French national character derived of cultural unity equaling 
national unity. Literature attesting to this on the French side of the spectrum includes: the 
historical French approach by Catherine Collomp of “Immigrants, labor markets, and the state, 
a comparative approach: France and the United States, 1880-1930”; centralized French 
Republic political ideology and national unity by Alexandra Kowalski of “The Nation, 
Rescaled: Theorizing the Decentralization of Memory in Contemporary France”; and French 
interpretation of religious liberty and ‘coercive assimilation’ by Laurence Moore of “Common 
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Principles, Different Histories: Understanding Religious Liberty in the United States and 
France.”186 Additionally, a useful publication analyzing France’s modern laws and policies 
regarding immigration is the Migration Policy Institute’s “Mainstreaming Immigrant 
Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives.” The 
paper is written in the context of the revised French integration plan of 2003 in which the 
previous 1993 integration plan was essentially expanded in capacity and funding.187 
At the other end of the spectrum is Germany’s federalist model, with overarching laws 
that are applied in a decentralized fashion by individual states. Modern German federalism is 
empowered by the constitution of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
implemented in 1949; more critically though, it descended from influences of the Marshall 
Plan implemented after World War II under General Lucius Clay.188 Useful articles discussing 
federalist Americanism influence under General Clay and the Marshall Plan to the formulation 
and implementation of Germany’s federalist constitution include: Anne Sa’adah’s “Regime 
Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution Building, and Democracy”; Marjorie 
Lamberti’s “General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis during the Making 
of West Germany’s Constitution”; and James Payne’s “Did the United States Create 
Democracy in Germany?”189  Finally, the best starting point to understanding Germany’s 
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modern national approach to migrant integration is Dr. Maria Bohmer’s (State Minister in the 
Federal Chancellery under the Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration, 
Refugees, and Integration) mission statement regarding the German National Integration Plan 
(NIP) of 2007. 190  The National Integration Plan is the overarching law that empowers 
individual states to enact migrant integration at the local level, but still synchronized and 
reinforced by national policy.191 
Specific formative case studies worthwhile noting in the literature relevant to France 
and Germany are diverse and numerous. Beginning briefly with France, assimilationist models 
and methods begin with the principal text of Paul A. Silverstein’s Algeria in France: 
Transpolitics, Race, and Nation. The account in some ways is an update to Eugen Weber’s 
Peasants into Frenchmen, but rather than look at education and language indoctrination as a 
driver to coercively assimilate peasants into metropolitan Frenchmen as Weber did, Silverstein 
instead examines the Algerian effect on an increasingly pluralist France. In Silverstein’s words, 
the text focuses on a modern “exanimation of transformation of ethno racial difference among 
Algerians and Franco- Algerians ... in the colonial and postcolonial periods [which] point to 
the changing nature of the French national identity from one based in empire to one now 
centered on Europe.”192 France’s integration model is governmentally centralized to Paris, so 
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in short, the text is a useful analysis for French state and socio-cultural integration response to 
mass Algerian immigration in the post-colonial time period and as relative to the Paris region 
in context. 
Accompanying this larger work are two other historically disparate works by Mamadou 
Diouf and Erik Bleich that both analyze how the colonial legacy of France informs its 
integration policies. Diouf’s work is an actual case study of French colonial management and 
assimilationist attempts in the Four Communes (Saint-Louis, Goree, Rufisque, and Dakar) of 
Senegal and how rather than create Frenchmen, “cultural and political hybridization 
developed” instead.193 It is insightful for comparing assimilationist practices historically at an 
empire held colony to later on of post-World War II practices in France. Bleich’s piece builds 
on this as a comparative case-study analysis between France and Britain and whether their 
colonial immigrant integration policies actually transmitted back in application to the ‘mother’ 
country in the post-colonial time period.194 Bleich’s assertion is of an opposing view that 
colonial legacy did not overly inform post-colonial integration policies in either France or 
Britain.195 Despite this, the article is informative to France assimilation tendencies as Bleich 
does admit that “France was employed state-centric assimilation with respect to its colonies 
and its integration policies [in France] more explicitly and moderately more often than has 
Britain.”196 
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Transitioning to Germany, there are a number of case studies relevant to immigrant 
integration in Berlin and at the national level, yet not a great number focused specifically on 
Stuttgart, let alone any that are comparative case studies between Stuttgart and Paris. There is, 
however, one excellent comparative case study by Ayse Ozbabacan on “Immigrant Integration 
at the Local Level: Comparison between Stuttgart and Selected U.S. Cities.”197 Recurring 
themes of ‘integration at the local level’ and ‘integration as a learning process’ are replete 
throughout the study and overall mirror the tone of the National Integration Plan, though it 
postdates the NIP by only two years.198 
Overall, case studies illustrate how ““history is the central construction of memory ... 
[and] memory is recognized as the core of identity ... [by] shared historical memories” imparted 
through education by the state. 199  French assimilationist and German multiculturalist 
applications share a central intent of transmitting single collective memory through society by 
the act of education. Through the literature this is evidenced in Eugen Weber’s Peasants into 
Frenchmen, and in modernity with Germany’s National Integration Plan. Alicia Houser’s and 
Philp W. Barker’s chapter “Learning to Remember: Education and collective memory 
formation as a tool in reconciliation” illustrate this point again in the case study of Northern 
Ireland’s method of teaching multiple histories in the classroom as an effective –though long-
term – reconciliation tool between Protestants and Catholics.200 Education in this manner 
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served to mitigate conflict between two different ethnic communities and created a new 
pluralistic, but equally important, and shared national identity.201 In sum, the literature is clear 
on the importance of education and training acting as a driver of integration. 
Concluding Thoughts on the Literature Relative to Migrant Integration in Europe 
This literature review sought to cover the body of knowledge surrounding the 
information gap of identifying specific lessons learned from past European immigration 
strategies that contributed to successful integration of current and future crisis migrant 
resettlement in Europe. Critical aspects to migrant integration strategy effectiveness discussed 
included: types of migration experienced in Germany and France in post-World War II Europe; 
models of government, including the centralized French Republic compared against a federally 
decentralized Germany; and the literature’s assessment of analysis effectiveness at the national 
level versus the local level. Next, the literature reviewed sought to ensure the value of the key 
questions utilized and that the case study methodological approach was sound in context to the 
field’s foundational works and methods. Finally, the three separate themes and associative 
literature were reviewed in order to justify this thesis’ factors of analysis of identity, policy, 
economics, and education as effective for determining key drivers to successful migrant 
integration strategy tactics and techniques. 
Looking forward, the next two chapters apply this methodology. Chapter three is a case 
study analysis of Paris, while chapter four is on Stuttgart. Both chapters cover pertinent aspects 
of the nation state for framing the discussion, context and background; but the case studies are 
focused principally at the local level of migrant integration. Lastly, both chapters utilize the 
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four factors of analysis of identity, policy, economics, and education in order to identify the 
























MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN PARIS, FRANCE 
The Paris riots of 2005 demonstrated to the citizens of France and the rest of the world 
a spectacle of the potential of a non-integrated class of citizens within a modem western 
European society. The 2005 riots began after two teenagers of Algerian descent fled from 
police in the French Paris suburb - or banlieues - of Clichy-sous-Bois and were electrocuted 
while taking refuge in an electrical substation.202 What ensued ended up as the worst social 
crisis in France since student-led unrest in 1968.203 France instituted a curfew imposed under 
the authority of a 1955 law dating to the 
French-Algerian War and declared a state of emergency.204 The final aftermath of the riots in 
the predominantly poor Muslim banlieues (suburbs) resulted in over 10,000 cars burned, 300 
buildings and schools set alight, and in excess of 4,700 people - predominantly youths -arrested 
for violence, theft, and petty crime.205 
The underlying causations sparking the widespread unrest in the banlieues are unclear, 
but point to economic factors at fault and exacerbated by racism and cultural/religious 
tensions.206 The banlieues originated in post-World War II as suburb areas outside of Paris 
where temporary migrant workers from former French colonies settled. Today, France contains 
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the second largest total population of Muslims in Europe behind only Germany at 4.7 million, 
but ranks number one in terms of percentage of the French population at 7.5 percent.207 
In 2005, France ranked only behind Italy and Belgium in European youth 
unemployment at a rate of 23 percent.208 Though France by law does not compile statistics tied 
to ethnicity, youth unemployment in the “sensitive urban zones” (e.g. banlieues) by 2005 rose 
to an astounding 40 percent.209 Even with a wide margin of error to these statistics, it points to 
a segment of French population prone to being disaffected and lacking means for upward 
mobility and inclusion to the rest of society. 
The French banlieues in of themselves are symbolic of a stratified French society. The 
banlieues as suburbs to Paris are an afterthought to the central boulevards of the Paris city 
center. The suburb of Clichy for example is only 15 kilometers outside of Paris, yet it takes 
more than an hour and a half by public transport to get downtown.210 The violent attack rate in 
Clichy rose by 37 percent from 2005 to 2009. 211  This statistic is not hard to imagine 
considering there were no police stations in Clichy until after 2010.212 These aspects lend 
themselves to an impression of the banlieue ghettos being in a state of “territorial apartheid” 
that physically embody minority claims of racial discrimination within French society and 
permeate to other associative aspects of social segregation and employment disadvantage.213 
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The dichotomy of the model is clearly at odds with the French Republic itself and its motto of 
“liberty, equality, fraternity.”214 
The riots did not end in 2005 though, as witnessed in the banlieues’ “two nights of car 
burning” in 2007 with 130 police injured, and again in 2010, with multiple buses and schools 
torched by youth gangs.215 To combat this trend, the French government spent $48 billion in 
aid to improve housing in the banlieues following 2005 through 2011 in tandem with an 
approach on tougher policing.216 A study published after these government efforts in 2011 by 
Professor Gilles Kepel pointed to a surprising conclusion that rather than becoming more 
inclusive, the isolation of the banlieues actually deepened - though in a new direction, towards 
Muslim identification.217 Kepel’s report found that though the issue of violence and petty crime 
from disaffected youth with high rates of unemployment persisted to some degree, the 
banlieues were now moving in a direction of “intensification of Muslim identity.”218 The study 
correlated the “growing grip of Islam to the state’s failure to promote integration” where 
Muslim identity and religious support structures increasingly filled voids created by exclusion 
from French society.219 
Lending credence to this theory, Islamic State affiliates attacked the Charlie Hebdo 
Paris offices four years later in January 2015, and then again in the November 2015 Paris 
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attacks. These two attacks underscore a recurring trend and potential link between radical 
Islamists and the banlieues.220 Several of the attackers either grew up in the banlieues or used 
the ghettoes for safe refuge prior to or following the attacks.221 In context, the November 2015 
Paris attacks killed 129 people, while the Charlie Hebdo and associated attacks killed 17 
people.222 
The linkage between the banlieues as an incubator for widespread radical Islamization 
is not conclusively proven; however, these factors raise poignant questions to why the higher 
frequency of minority unrest and attacks in Paris, as compared to the rest of Europe.223 This 
case study analyzes the myriad influences on migrant and successive generation integration in 
Paris through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and education. The section on 
identity delves into what it means to be Parisian French analyzing associative sub-factors of 
segregation, discrimination, religion, and radicalization. The following section on policy 
explores modern and historical integration policy approaches undertaken in France. The third 
section of economics examines the influence that employment, poverty, and potential for 
upward mobility play into migrant integration in Paris. The final section of education analyzes 
the role public schooling and training serve to the overall integration strategy and evaluated 
whether or not, this function is forced. 
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The French and Paris banlieues have not always suffered from a negative public image. 
Originally large-scale social housing estates (grands ensembles, referred generally to as HLMs 
or housing projects) replaced non-government affiliated shantytowns (bidonvilles) that sprang 
up immediately post-World War II.224 The HLMs of the 1950s and ‘60s became associated 
with their location at designated peripheral (banlieue) areas of Paris and elsewhere (known as 
Zones a Urbaniser par Priorite, Priority Urbanization Areas or ZUPs) during a time of rapid 
industrialization and urbanization post-World War II.225 Middle class families utilized the 
housing areas in the post-war years, but housing finance reform in 1977 enabled those with the 
means of steady incomes to exit ZUPs and HLMs, which by then had become characterized as 
socio-economically disadvantaged areas of high unemployment, decrepit infrastructure, and 
lacking public services and transportation. 226  French urban policy origins date to the 
aforementioned housing reform of 1977 by establishing the Housing and Social Life (Habitat 
et Vie Sociale, HVS) department, which conceived of large-scale low-income housing as an 
answer to billeting shortages for temporary migrant workers.227 At this point in the late 1970s 
the banlieue was not associated with ethnic or religious overtones, rather only viewed as an 
economically blighted area associated with public housing ‘projects.’228 
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Segregated Populations 
In the vacuum the middle class left, and by facilitation of HVS, immigrants moved in. 
The 1980s became marked by banlieues becoming associated with ethnic migrants and their 
‘immigrant problems’ with the first well known incident of unrest occurring in the banlieues 
during the ‘hot summer’ of 1981, which while it cannot be attributed to any one specific event, 
resulted in five large-scale riots and some 250 cars either stolen or torched.229 By the 1990s a 
negative image of the banlieues had firmed in the minds of French citizens with banlieue riots 
normal and Paris suburb areas seen largely as ghettos with Islam major influence needing to 
be policed.230 These attitudes intensified post-9/11 in an era defined by heightened security 
and unfair populist labeling of terrorist and Muslim being synonymous.231 In this environment, 
the riots of 2005 in Paris banlieue were immediately labeled as ‘Muslim riots’ comprised of 
gangs of criminal youth, rather than simply as ‘French youth.’232 
The Paris banlieue embody the character of ghettos that underlie the angst segregating 
traditional white Europeans from those of the ‘new’ non-white Muslim second and third-
generation immigrants from predominantly Algeria and other North African French former 
colony nations.233 Banlieues are physical embodiments of populations not integrated to the rest 
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of Paris and greater France by being segregated from the rest of Paris socially, economically, 
and governmentally.234 This physical segregation breeds societal norm connoted with ‘us’ as 
the ‘insider’ Parisians versus ‘them’ as the ethnic ‘outsiders’ to larger Parisian society both 
figuratively and literally.235 The French publication Le Monde in June 13, 2002 succinctly 
summarized this by stating: 
Provided that the Republic does cope with the task and first sweeps with a new broom 
among the ghetto gangs. The Police must get back to work ... Most of the misconduct 
and brutality is not perpetuated by the police. It is the scum (raccailles) that kills most 
in the ghettos.236 
 
In fairness, law and order are intrinsic to the functioning of any society, but it is enlightening 
to the environment of social stratification when a socialist left-leaning publication such as Le 
Monde blatantly labels geographically located citizens as scum regardless of their individual 
dispositions or social qualities.237 
In regards to being an integrating forcing function for better or worse, banlieues fail 
the litmus test by actually further segregating migrants and their descendants from the rest of 
Paris society rather integrating them in to it. Segregation exists as spatial in terms of both the 
physical and social planes.238 In this manner, spatial distances disadvantage migrants and their 
descendants in Paris banlieues by limiting access to goods and services, limiting intercultural 
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exchanges between different majority/minority groups, and particularly limiting language 
competence to the receiving society.239 Segregating ethnic migrants to live amongst their own 
also invites an ‘ethnic mobility trap,’ where incentives to integrate to greater society are 
diminished due to familiarity in the local environment.240 In short, the migrant integrates into 
a Paris banlieue not very dissimilarly to the society he or she departed. 
A challenge to breaking this cycle in Paris is structural – roads, housing, transport links, 
and demographic make-up of communities. While French and Paris authorities on some level 
have the best of intentions to integrate and assimilate all citizens to being wholly ‘French’, it 
is very difficult to do in actuality when native and migrant populations are segregated 
geographically to the peripheral areas of Paris. Gentrifying or at minimum moving to 
intercultural housing is one solution utilized and recommended by the European Foundation’s 
CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policy), but this method is at odds with French 
secularity (laïcité) laws as it relies on selecting and placing individuals in “mixed-income 
housing” areas by ethnic background, rather than by income.241 
Discrimination in the Guise of Secularism 
Laïcité or secularism came about as simply separation of church and state when enacted 
in 1905 under the Third Republic.242 The constitution of the Fifth Republic updated the law to 
ensure the “equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction to their origin, race, or 
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religion.”243 For roughly the past hundred years this secular law and tradition worked; post-
2001 though laïcité is becoming emblematic as a demarcation line between the status quo of 
secular French national identity and evolving French Muslim identity. Galvanizing this conflict 
between French traditionalists and ethnic Muslims predominantly from former colonies in 
North Africa was a simple piece of clothing – a headscarf, called the hijab.244 Prior to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, punishments for wear of the hijab or other religious wear in French 
schools was rare.245 Post-9/11, wear of the hijab became representative to an assault on the 
tradition of French laïcité and made the humble secular law more akin to an entrenched 
ideology.246 
The ban on Islamic veils was popular not only within far-right political parties, but 
across all spectrums in France when enacted in 2010.247  In July of that year the French 
Parliament passed the ban 335 to one, while the French Senate also passed the bill later in 
September with a vote of 246 to one.248 The fact that approximately only 1,900 women across 
France actually wore the hijab at that point was of little consequence in the social dialogue and 
associated movements.249 Though popularly labeled under the nationalist auspices of laïcité, 
the ban instead made Islamophobia in France recognized. Had the discussion instead been 
about Christian crucifixes, Jewish yarmulkes, or Sikh turbans it likely would have immediately 
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been labeled as racist.250 This predicament is analogous to the French misunderstanding that 
not all citizens are alike – no matter the stance of centralized government towards status quo 
assimilation be it coercive or otherwise.251 Rather than focus policies towards integrating 
migrants and ethnic segments of the population, France instead expects fringe citizens and 
migrants to simply conform to the rest of society.252 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) quantifies these anti-
Muslim sentiments with Pew Research Centre survey results noting a median of 46 percent of 
respondents in France having negative views towards Muslims.253 Likewise the same report 
noted from the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights in 2013 a 15 percent 
increase of anti-Muslim acts in France as compared to 2012, as well as 53 percent increase of 
Islamophobia crimes in the same time period with women the primary targets.254 The crime 
rates match survey results from the French institute of market research and opinion (BVA), 
which outlined a “resurgence of racism in France, stemming in particular from a disturbing 
significant increase in explicit racism, especially against Muslims, Roma, and Jews.”255 
Returning again to the example of the Paris banlieue riots of 2005, the impetus of these 
and other riots lie in confrontation between banlieue youth and police, often with the spark 
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specifically tied to the killing – accidental or otherwise – of a second or third generation 
immigrant origin young person.256 The underlying anxiety is nothing new. Aggressive security 
postures followed 1990s riots in banlieues deemed to be outside the law due to “overpopulation 
degraded housing, school failure, unemployment, insecurity, and communitarian co-
existence”; all of which increased tension between banlieue populations and the state.257 The 
republic’s answer to this malaise was to again increase the state’s security posture in the cities 
though the three priorities of “authority, activity, and identity.”258 In short, this effort equaled 
enforcing the law in ‘outlaw areas’ of the banlieue, trying to spur business in depressed areas 
by passing on tax benefits to small businesses, and integrating immigrants and citizens through 
cultural outreach programs to remind populations of the preeminence of being French.259 
Despite the program’s best intentions in design, what actually occurred instead from the 1990s 
onwards was a heavy police presence to correct the public’s perception of ‘territorial fracture’ 
and the “ethnic nature of the problem of social housing estates in banlieues, seen to be 
threatening the integrity of the republic and its values.”260 From this point forward ‘immigrant 
integration’ became tantamount to the issues of security and violence in the banlieue.261 
The everyday manifestation of targeting ethnic communities is best evidenced in the 
police practice of “controle au facies (identity checks on the basis of physical appearance)”, 
which are at the heart of conflict between banlieue immigrant youth and police.262 Racial 
                                                             
256 Dikec, Badlands of the Republic, 90, 159. 
257 Ibid, 93. 
258 Ibid.  
259 Ibid, 93-94. 
260 Ibid, 124. 
261 Ibid.  
262 Open Society Justice Initiative, Profiling Minorities: A study of Stop-and-search Practices in Paris 
(New York: Open Society Institute, 2009), 15, accessed January 12, 2017, 
http://www.opensocietyfoundatios.org/sites/default/files/search_20090630.Web.pdf.  
70 
profiling is known to be common in France, but proving it is difficult given that French law 
prohibits gathering of any type of ethnic statistical data.263 In 2009, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative published findings on independent research of police stops and identity checks in 
Paris.264 Their findings suggest that police in Paris disproportionately target ethnic minorities, 
with blacks (sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin) six times more likely to be slopped than 
whites; and Arabs (North African or Maghrebian origin) 7.6 times more likely than whites.265 
Police identity checks were another incidence correlating to active profiling by those stopped 
wearing ‘youth culture clothing.’266 Those with the highest overall incidence were noted as 
youth ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs.’ 267  Lastly, police were also under pressure to fulfill their 
“deportation quotas” for the time period by checking likely candidates as being undocumented 
and illegally residing migrants under the authority of the Ministry on Immigration, National 
Identity, and Joint Development.268 
On one level it is always possible that police could be independently targeting certain 
ethnic demographics, but it more likely points to a pervasive attitude within the greater 
society.269 From the opposite vantage, frequent unwarranted harassment by police to ethnic 
communities and migrants, and migrant youth (second and third generations) ratchet up the 
possibility for conflict and hostility as evidenced in the increased tenacity of rioting in the 
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2000s compared with earlier time periods.270 Lucienne Bui-Trong, creator of the ‘Cities and 
Banlieues’ section of the French Intelligence Service (RG) remarked on this subject: 
Riots occur in neighborhoods with a large population of immigrant origin, so they 
primarily reflect a difficulty of integration, and resentment, so, a resentment very 
strongly felt by young people of the second generation, and even the third generation 
too ...these problems are experienced as a rejection from society ... That’s why in the 
neighborhoods, which are also targeted by urban policy, in neighborhoods that are very 
poor, but in which foreign population is not important, we don’t have the phenomenal 
of riots, because you don’t have the same resentment against society in general, so that 
factor of riots is connected to... the fact that, one is in touch with other cultures, while 
also integrated in French culture, but with the feeling of being rejected by French 
society.271 
 
Resurgent Muslim Culture at Risk to Radicalization 
The modern challenge to migrant - and successive generational – integration is 
increasingly having to do less with ethnicity and more with religion or connotations of culture 
perceived as religion. There is a resurgence of Islam in France today among second and third 
generation migrants that did not exist with their parents and is emerging in a post-9/11 world 
as a transnational political force that competing with French values for citizenship and 
loyalty.272 Evidence points to a minority population within this demographic (second and third 
generation immigrants) that resists assimilation more strenuously than their parents, or even 
grandparents.273 Ostracized and discriminated against by the majority society, Paris migrant 
youth increasingly turn to Islam as a new “badge of identity” either in religiosity or by simply 
aligning their cultural origins with the idealized Muslim distinctiveness.274 
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Laïcité in France is not anti-religious, but rather anti-clerical.275 To break the church’s 
monopoly on power in 1905, France confiscated all buildings used for religious purposes and 
only allowed them to be used by associations cultureless (worship associations).276 Christian 
educational institutions were also removed from the state academic systems, and French 
secularism laws do not allow for any training of any religious leadership by state institutions, 
though religious communities are allowed to run their own schools with public funding 
covering the majority of the cost.277 Despite this, Minister of Internal Affairs J.P. Chevenement 
and his successor Nicolas Sarkozy established a representative council of Islamic organizations 
(Le Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman) in 2003 with elected leaders of similar composition 
to that of immigrant communities.278 
A state sanctioned Islamic organization seems to go against the grain of secularity, but 
the intent of the notion was to bring a form of legitimacy to Islamic umbrella organizations 
while maintaining a state hands-off approach. The long-term goal was two-fold in first 
mitigating the rise of non-integrating parallel societies worshipping at radical underground 
mosques by self-styled imams; and second ensure uniformity and baseline standardization in 
imam education.279 For this reason, and to maintain hands-off legitimacy, France accepted 
allegiance between the Algerian government and the Grand Mosque of Paris and similarly with 
the Moroccan government who established the advisory Council of Moroccan Community in 
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Foreign Countries in Paris that advises and assists Moroccan mosques. This approach is 
practical and shows promise in success long-term for tile majority of moderate Muslims in 
Paris and France who practice at legal mosques affiliated with the council of Islamic 
organizations. 
These positive developments and overtures on the part of Paris and French central 
government are not without a downside, however. First, the Centre for European Studies notes 
that there is tension rising between older and more traditional Muslims and their younger 
“acculturated counterparts” who - if they are active Muslims at all – may not practice at 
mosques affiliated within the umbrella council of Islamic organizations, and further, tend to 
gravitate to authority figures and associative discussion online.280 Second, unemployment and 
racism at the margins of society in banlieues have convinced ‘Muslim youth culture’ that they 
are not welcome in the majority society, while Islam provides an alternate identity of 
respectability and purpose.281 This is not the Muslim culture of their fathers; Muslim youth in 
the banlieues of Paris do not speak the colloquial Arabic of their Maghrebi parents, do not 
attend mosque, but do “eat McDonald’s, wear baseball caps, buy expensive clothes, fully 
engage in consumerism and breed dogs at home.”282 Younger generations of Muslim youth - 
formerly referred to as beur (as their parents were) - identify as verlan (slang), which is 
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revealing being not Arabic in origin, but rather “legacy of a French tradition of ‘outcasts’ and 
thugs.”283 
Migrant Integration Policy Efforts in Paris 
There are some overall positive trends to migrant integration and French policy 
approach, though challenges assuredly remain. Of the approximately five million Muslims in 
France today, 30 percent are of Algerian descent with half of those born or brought up in France 
and called Les Beurs.284 This population is generally better integrated than their parents, with 
women less oppressed or subjected to arranged marriages, and the group as a whole has a 
“close to 80% [rate] of Beurs who... take a non-Arab as their partner.”285 
Policymaking relative to immigration and integration in France is largely centralized 
at the national level. Integration policies only target an immigrant’s first five years residing in 
France; thereafter that same individual must rely only on general policies.286 The practice is 
called ‘mainstreaming’ where support to migrants is provided through policies addressed to 
the general public. Immigrant integration programs within the first five years fall under the 
responsibility of the Interior Ministry’s Office for Integration, Reception, and Citizenship 
(Direction de l’accueil, de l’integration, el de la ciloyennete, or DAIC) and generally include 
some language training, orientation, and limited social welfare for support and access to 
employment.287 After live years, migrants, their children, and successive generations’ support 
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is ‘mainstreamed’ and addressed through the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal 
Opportunity (l ‘agence pour la cohesion sociale et l ‘egalite des chances, or Acse) which falls 
within the responsibility of the Paris City Ministry.288 Gauging the success of this policy 
approach is difficult since French law prohibits tracking statistics by ethnicity and the French 
Republican tradition distrusts “policies that target a particular group over others.”289 
Post 1999, the number of permanent immigrants entering France had swelled by greater 
than ten percent year over year, with 2012 equaling 150,000.290 Of these, 63 percent come from 
the Maghreb region of North Africa.291 Immigration and integration reform followed with the 
2007 Law on Immigration, Integration, and Asylum (Loi du 20 Novembre 2007 relative a 
l’immigration. a l’integration, et l ‘asile) initiating the use of the Reception and Integration 
Contract, which is administered by the National Office for Immigration, and Integration based 
in Paris.292 The contract is between the migrant and France and commits the newcomer to 
“learning French and becoming familiar with French laws” with any renewal of contract 
contingent to the immigrant’s commitment to fulfill the contract. 293  Failure to fulfill the 
contract, or residing illegally in the country, results in deportation of which there were 40,000 
of in 2012 (compared to 25,000 in 2005) including repatriations.294 
French integration law focuses on three policy areas of public intervention - education, 
employment, and social cohesion. 295  Lacking the legal ability to specifically target new 
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migrant groups or alternatively their offspring following the first five years, the policy 
approach undertaken in Paris by the central government lacks the effectiveness it might 
otherwise have. Acse focuses ‘mainstreamed’ policies towards disadvantaged districts called 
Priority Neighborhoods (currently 2,500, but being scaled down to 1,300). 296  Priority 
Neighborhoods are selected based on overall poverty levels of the geographic area, rather than 
number or percentage of immigrants or successive generation immigrants residing in the 
area. 297  This aligns to French tradition and laws conforming to not targeting specific 
demographics by race, origin, or religion.298 The disadvantage to this approach is that estimates 
place 60 percent of arriving immigrants outside of Priority Neighborhoods, which includes 
rural and other poor areas.299 In short, the policy by targeting geographically destitute areas 
only addresses poverty, not migrant or migrant successive generation integration. 
In education, policy areas seek to focus on migrant integration. French ministry of 
Education effort however lacks effectiveness due to their reluctance of specifically targeting 
descendants (post five years’ arrival in France) of immigrants and being singularly focused on 
language training.300 Similar to the overall policy approach, funds are directed to be spent in 
Priority Neighborhoods with no quantifiable data available to address whether they reach 
migrant children or simply just poverty stricken children. In the specific case of Paris for 
example, an official first referred to the high concentration of immigrants and successive 
generations in the city, but then also acknowledged that some children might actually be of 
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French origin.301 In short, at the top level of policy formulation, target accuracy is not effective 
due to inability of the state to track by origin, ethnicity, or race; while at the local level similar 
ineffectiveness also is present. 
Employment policy efforts are marked by being either language proficiency or anti-
discriminatory focused.302 Anti-discrimination were laws passed in 1997, 2001, and 2002 in 
an effort to curb discrimination and racism in the workplace. 303  Despite these efforts, 
discrimination against minorities and migrants in the workplace remains pervasive, though not 
officially recognized in accordance with French equality laws disallowing any compiling of 
statistics by race.304 Migrants, and successive generations, are generally congregated in low-
skill jobs though individual qualifications often exceed the specific job requirements. Also, 
public services cannot officially target migrants or migrant children, outside of the 
Employment Ministry directing funds to employers (when qualified under five years) on behalf 
of migrants for language and professional skills.305 
Social cohesion policy is not actually a policy area at all, rather a focus effort 
recognized and supported by Acse but executed between local community associations and 
non-governmental actors.306 This policy effort, as compared to education and employment, 
does reach intended immigrant community beneficiaries as local actors are not bound by the 
same restrictions of the national government and city ministries and work hand in hand with 
local communities. This policy area shows promise of social services actually reaching 
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intended targets of migrant and successive generations by examples including immigrant youth 
directly benefitting in gaining professional job experiences through internships and mentoring, 
and unemployed adults serving as facilitators in the community for social services.307 
The Economics of the Banlieue 
Factors of identity, policy, and education provide the means of socialization and 
mobilization to an individual’s potential to integrate to the larger society, but the impetus in 
pushing migrants and successive generations toward or away from integrating to greater Paris 
society is in the economic viability to do so. The banlieue in this context evolved into a 
systematic (i.e. systemic throughout France metropolitan banlieue areas) non-integrated space 
capable of being an incubator of radicalization. 308  Banlieues concentrate “socially and 
economically weak people” to specific geographic areas that exhibit a preponderance of high 
rates of unemployed ethnic populations.309 A vignette is the banlieue of Mantes-la-Jolie in the 
Paris region and its associated social housing neighborhood of Le Val-Fourre. The suburb is 
illustrative as it was included in the various progressive urban policies of central government, 
yet still experienced rioting in 1991 and again in 2005.310 
The village of Mantes is a banlieue (suburb) 34 miles (58 kilometers) north- west of 
Paris.311 Like many troubled banlieues, it is a divided city of unequal parts. The village itself 
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is pleasant and situated along the River Seine with cafes and a fourteenth-century cathedral; to 
the west three kilometers away and isolated by peripheral boulevards is the ZUP of Val-Fourre, 
a massive congregation of apartment blocks of twenty-plus stories high.312 Designed in the 
1960s and finally completed in 1977, the structure was housed substantially (25 percent or 
more) by Maghrebi and other African immigrants recruited from overseas to work for the 
automobile industry and in other temporary jobs.313 Employers took responsibility to shuttle 
the workers to and from the HLM.314 By the 1990s, the HLM housed more than 25,000 people, 
fifty percent of whom were of Maghreb immigrant origin, in “eight distinct cities ... [which] 
includes eleven schools, sports facilities ... a cultural center, and an outdoor shopping mall.”315  
The area is largely cut off by metropolitan transit, both to the village of Mantes or into Paris 
since the original designers planned for the HLM to be self-sustaining with temporary migrant 
employers responsible for work transportation requirements.316 As such even today it takes in 
a car between 54 minutes and up to one hour and nineteen minutes to arrive to Paris; for those 
without a personal vehicle it is even worse as there are no easy routes (Google Maps has zero 
route options available by public-transit), and a commute into Paris can take up to four hours 
one way.317 
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Comparing unemployment rates between the two areas is similarly informative. 
Mantes’ unemployment rate increased from 3.9 percent in 1975 to 10.3 percent in 1982, then 
12.l in 1990, and finally 20.2 percent in 1999.318 More dramatically, in the nearby Le Val-
Fourre social housing neighborhoods unemployment spiked from 15.7 percent in 1990 to 25.7 
in 1999. 319  Qualifying this economic reality, a resident described why he stayed in the 
banlieue: 
I didn’t particularly choose to come and live here ...If I could go and live elsewhere, I 
would ... it’s not our own doing, it’s not a choice! But maybe it ‘s the networks, you 
see, you know someone? ... No, no, no!.. That was in our parent’s time... when my 
father came, he came because he knew someone here ... so he came and got a job ... 
But we didn’t choose to live here... we chose because financial constraints make you 
come here... I ‘d leave, if I had the means, I’d leave!320 
 
Education: Migrants into Frenchmen 
The French Republic creed of liberty, equality, and fraternity implies a doctrine that all 
French citizens be awarded the same opportunities. In regards specifically to educating migrant 
origin individuals in Paris, the goal is equality and an end state of social mobility; instead 
appearance and unofficial surveys (those conducted by private parties and research groups) 
findings suggest an environment of “social downgrading.” 321  Statistically proving this is 
difficult in France as official surveys conducted by the Ministry of Education only record a 
child’s nationality, not ethnicity or cultural origin. 322  Schools in France are republican 
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assimilationist institutions “indifferent to differences ... [and] intended to teach all children in 
an equal manner, whatever their origins.”323 
Downward pressure disadvantaging migrant origin individuals and youth, as compared 
to native French citizens, are based on four elements. First is the obvious demographic factor 
that the majority of migrants and second-generation migrant-origin youth belong to the poorer 
classes of French society.324 Second, despite policy goals directing additional resources and 
staff to special education areas (Zones d ‘Education Prioritaire. or ZEP), banlieue schools 
continually suffer as lower in quality than peer institutes attended by native French elsewhere 
in Paris.325 Third is the factor that education and career/job skill preparation in Paris feeds 
migrant origin youth into low-skill career fields with limited upward mobility prospects in a 
post-industrial society.326 Finally, cultural factors and attitudes towards formal education by 
Muslim parents differ markedly from that of native French and generally impact negatively on 
migrant successive generational career success.327 
Beginning with the first factor, immigrant ancestry in of itself does not predetermine an 
individual to a life of lower social standing. Instead the two predominant factors of migrants 
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having larger families (“61% of children of immigrants live in families of at least 4 children, 
as opposed to 15% for children of French native parents”) and parents of migrant children 
being of lower social standing contribute to explaining why youth are less successful at 
school.328 For example 88 percent of North African migrants work in low/no-skill occupations 
(manual, clerical, sales) having either little or no formal education themselves with fathers of 
this ethnic origin also suffering from high unemployment (19 percent compared to 2 percent 
of French natives).329 Lower socio-economic standing of migrant families’ handicap children 
from succeeding early on in primary school with many later being guided towards vocational 
tracks with limited career prospects.330 
Secondly, high concentrations of poorer classes of citizens in areas such as the 
banlieues created a negative “neighborhood effect” on the quality of local schools, which is 
why ZEPs were instituted.331 Concentrations of migrant origin youth are particularly high in 
ZEP schools (50 percent compared to five percent in non-ZEP schools in 1998-1999), and have 
created a commonly accepted social perception that ZEP schools with higher proportions of 
foreigners correlated to lower quality education and higher rates of violence.332 This social 
perception of ZEP schools creates a self- perpetuating segregation cycle mirroring the banlieue 
- despite extra staff and resources from being designated a ZEP school - with middle-class 
parents moving their kids to ‘better’ schools. 333  Likewise, community and educational 
segregation are closely connected with teachers adapting practices of “‘leveling down” 
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(lowering standards, slowing student progress, relaxed grading) to cope with the challenge of 
educating migrant origin youth. 334  The previous factor completes the cycle by creating 
“educational ghettoes” where migrant origin youth are disadvantaged to ever escaping 
poverty.335 
Examining the third factor of educational job training reveals two associative sub-
factors at present. First, as previously discussed within the French educational system, migrant 
origin youth in banlieues are disproportionately leveled down to vocational school tracks, or 
otherwise end up dropping out following college.336 For example, statistics from 1999 tracking 
the second generation of Morocco and Turkish origin migrants recruited to work in France 
reveal that Turks dropped out at a rate of 56.2 
percent with another 33.5 percent completing vocational schools, while Moroccans were at 48 
and 36.8 percent respectively in the same categories.337 This equates to a majority of migrant 
origin youth going into low/no skill or middle skill careers with constrained upward mobility. 
The second sub-factor that limits the aforementioned upward mobility of manual labor 
career tracks is that Paris and greater France has been undergoing a post-industrial 
transformation to being a post-Fordism (globalized) society along with other modern 
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economies worldwide post-l990s.338 Post-Fordism societies are accentuated by: globalized 
markets and production; trending towards market-centric and techno-centric industries for 
quality and flexibility executed under management practices such as Total Quality 
Management (TQM); and networkization defining the new role of workers where industries 
increasingly outsource low skill jobs in order to focus on the core of the business which consists 
principally of high skill jobs only.339 Utilizing examples from the same time period of 1999, 
exposes downstream effects of the second generation migrant origin youths that had either 
dropped out of college or attended only a vocational track with 42.8 percent of Moroccans in 
manual labor jobs or another 30.8 percent being unemployed. 340  This is compared more 
alarmingly to Turks in the same categories at 64.1 percent in manual labor and 33.3 percent 
unemployed.341 Finally, these statistics of unemployment suggest widespread discrimination 
in the workplace against non-European origin migrants; this is exhibited by Portuguese migrant 
origin youth comparatively at only 10.6 percent in unemployment.342 
The final factor related to education and migrant integration is that of cultural aspects 
and attitudes affecting successive generation offspring achievement in formal schooling. This 
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factor is broken down into three sub-factors of migrant parental attitudes and aspirations for 
their children in regards to formal education, the gender gap in graduation rates, and a tendency 
of Muslim migrant parents to concentrate resources unequally among children. 343  North 
African migrant parental attitudes towards formal education are markedly different from those 
of other European migrant parents by North Africans aspiring to higher education success for 
their children.344 In numbers, migrant parents of North African origin aspired to their children 
attaining a general baccalaureate at a rate of 47.5 percent compared to Southern European 
origin migrants only aspiring the same for their children at a rate of 26 percent.345 In short, due 
to the high proportion of North Africans either out of work (19 percent) or in manual labor 
jobs (88 percent) they want better for their children. 
Aspiration and actuality are two different aspects of the same issue though. Despite the 
greatest of expectations for their children, children of migrants have an uphill road to success 
due to normally attending ZEP schools in geographically challenged areas such as the banlieue, 
parents often possessing only limited education, frequently not being fluent in French, and 
having poor understanding of how the school system works.346 In social terms, migrant parents 
have high aspirations for their children, but this does not necessarily carry over to active 
support with research surveys noting that migrant origin parents talk about school with children 
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much less often than parents of French origin.347 By the numbers, results from secondary 
schools disclose that students of migrant background are 2.5 times more likely than native 
French to exit with no qualification (diploma) and further that their baccalaureate pass rate is 
ten percentage points lower.348 Going deeper within this statistic notes that there is a marked 
gender gap between migrant origin boys and girls. Boys compared to girls are twice as likely 
to drop out, girls are better at adapting their choices to test results as evidenced by less failure 
in vocational tracks than boys and likely because girls seek emancipation, and finally the 
gender gap is widest among North African migrants with girls 31 percent succeeding more 
often in school than boys.349 
Finally, the third sub-factor relates to resource allocation and investment of children by 
Muslims compared to other religions. Broadly speaking, research findings from Andreea 
Mitrut and Francois-Charles Wolff are that educational attainment is much lower by Muslims 
than non-Muslims within France (reference figure three below).350 Muslim migrants by origin 
are 90.5 percent from North Africa, whereas non-Muslims are predominantly from Europe and 
especially Southern Europe.351 More than this though, Mitrut and Wolff s research indicate 
that Muslim parents unequally distribute resources on children, where the greater number of 
siblings negatively impact education achievement and later-born children are more resource 
constrained.352 Interestingly, despite this unequal allocation of resources, gender does not bear 
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a significant impact on educational success, though Muslim girls still lag that of non-Muslim 
migrant girls in school achievement.353 
Figure 3.1: Children’s Educational Attainment Differentiated by Parents’ Religion. Sample 
includes only children aged 24 and older.354 
Concluding Remarks 
Evidence from the case study suggests that assimilationist policies in Paris led to non-
integrated and disadvantaged Muslim populations existing in segregated banlieues with 
individuals discriminated against by authorities and the migrant population at large having 
limited economic prospects, and thereby at risk to behaviors of violence and Islamist 
radicalization. This case study utilized a methodology of analyzing migrant and successive 
generation integration in Paris through the four factors of identity, policy, economics, and 
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education. Of these four factors utilized, Paris exhibits an environment in which competing 
aspects of identity are more problematic to successful migrant integration than the other three 
factors. Identifying migrant and successive generation integration as a problem in Paris and 
France did not result in a planned and comprehensive overhaul of internal support structures 
where integration – rather than immigration – was the target focus. At the root of the problem 
in Paris lies peripheral suburb areas of the banlieue as segregated environments in which once 
temporary migrant workers are now French citizens with children (second generation) and 
grandchildren (third generation). 
Vignettes and examples provided within the identity factor point to populations of 
migrants and succeeding second and third generations predominantly of Maghrebi origins 
being marginalized by segregation from the rest of French society, identity, and economy. 
Segregated and discriminated against in the banlieues and HLMs, migrants are treated as 
second-class citizens in the media, by the state (represented by the Police), and in their abject 
surroundings cut-off physically from greater Paris. French and Parisian society expects 
migrants and successive generations to assimilate and integrate, but only within a cultural 
double standard; in response rioting, insecurity, and escaping to alternate respectable identities 
in Islam are understandable and the most readily available recourses. Lastly, despite the best 
of intentions in laïcité laws, evidence points to strict secularity adherence allowing racism and 
discrimination to persist on a consistent basis by denying quantifiable data compilation by race, 
origin, and religion. 
French Central Government policy continues strict adherence to laïcité where migrant 
origins are invisible and thus under supported and not statistically tracked for improvement. 
Arguably five years of focus on migrant integration is adequate for language baseline 
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proficiency, but not for total integration into Parisian society and the labor market. 
Improvements have been made in recognizing problems in discrimination against migrants and 
successive generations, but the issue will never be fully addressed as long as it is not tracked 
by race or ethnicity in order to gain wider recognition within society and the workplace. In 
sum, French integration policy largely fails because it places the greater part of the burden on 
the migrant to integrate without compromise to Parisian status quo society. The lack of 
flexibility in this strict assimilationist approach results in only inclusion or exclusion for the 
migrant. While inclusion is an obvious success for France, exclusion reinforces a migrant’s 
natural tendency to congregate with one’s own cultural identity in the peripheral and parallel 
areas of society in the banlieue. 
Economics is the means of social mobility for integration and transition of lower social 
groups to the socio-economic middle-class and upper-class. As related in the vignette earlier, 
unemployment rates of 20 to almost 26 percent of a given population not only restrict social 
mobility, but also create environments where populations become disenfranchised or possibly 
even combative to the state. By appearance, the banlieue environment is one of a stratified 
society with the migrant origin demographics subjugated and segregated from the majority 
Parisian population. These factors should matter to Paris and France; environments of high 
unemployment sow discontent with the given populace and push it closer to a tipping point 
where migrant individuals’ allegiance may not be to France, but instead to a parallel society or 
alternative authority. 
In examining education as a factor of integration, it is glaringly obvious that Paris did 
not take a note from France’s own history as demonstrated by author Eugen Weber. Education 
as an acculturation tool is lacking in Paris; rather educating migrants and successive 
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generations is seen more as a chore and battlefront for laïcité laws to the hijab, rather than as a 
socializing influence for non-integrated populations. Just as historical 19th Century France 
turned ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ through the acculturating influence of public education, so 
too can this be modernly undertaken in regards to migrant origin citizens if executed 
systemically and equally.355 
Strong points of the Paris’ efforts towards migrant integration include controlling 
illegal immigration (restrains input), support to language training, and legitimizing Islamic 
mosques through representative councils. Weak points in the effort are more widespread. 
Racism is pervasive and reinforces segregation as a non-integrating force, there is no policy 
focus for migrant inclusion post live years in country, and neither is there any attention to 
successive generation migrant origin individuals who are most at risk (e.g. Muslim youth). 
The synthesis of looking at the good and the bad reveals that Paris banlieues are 
evolving into parallel Islamic societies with their own values, but still in the heart of sovereign 
France. Populations rejected from mainstream culture are at risk to being sympathetic to 
competing ideologies. This combination of factors makes the banlieue an incubator of 
radicalization to at-risk youth who are sheltered by a complicit local community, which has 
apparently ostracized themselves from greater Parisian society. 
Leaving aside the theoretical application of assimilation and integration policy models, 
there is a practical question that French majority society needs to decide Are citizens willing 
to accept a new version of French identity that incorporates French Muslims? By not socially 
including Muslims of the banlieue, French majority society by default excludes them and puts 
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them and the areas they reside in at risk to poverty, insecurity, and radicalization. In conclusion, 
Paris is likely to continue down this familiar path in the struggle of integrating migrants and 
successive generations accepted into the fold of the republic as temporary workers post-World 
War II, colonial subordinates in the aftermath of the Algerian War, and currently as legal 





















MIGRANT INTEGRATION IN STUTTGART, GERMANY 
 In the wake of the Paris terror attacks of November 2015, a different sort of panic 
began to ferment within Germany. An explosion in annual migrant entries to the European 
Union ballooned from 290,975 in 2011 to 1,222,925 in 2015. 356  Germany accepted the 
majority of these numbers with approximately 1.1 million accepted in 2015 and another 5.6 
million expected over the course of the next five years through 2020.357 Against these statistics 
as a social backdrop, New Year’s Eve festivities of 2015 witnessed an unprecedented wave of 
sexual assaults against hundreds of women by predominantly North African and Middle 
Eastern foreigners in the cities of Cologne, Hamburg, and Stuttgart.358 
An internal report conducted afterward by Germany’s national police, the 
Bundespolizei, found that law enforcement officials were overwhelmed and lost control of the 
situation on New Year’s Eve.359 Due to the limited police presence in the German cities during 
the festivities, confusion at the individual scenes, and a lack of identification of the mobs of 
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men, it is uncertain the exact origin of the perpetrators in the attacks on the New Year’s Eve in 
Cologne, Hamburg, or Stuttgart. The overall consensus of police officials though is that there 
was a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Muslim migrant link to the sexual crimes; either 
from those newly arrived in Germany, those illegally residing without immigration documents, 
or those of migrant successive generations.360 
Public reaction condemning the misogynistic attacks on New Year’s Eve were swift 
and widespread within Germany and much the rest of the western world. German people’s 
willkommenskultur (welcome culture) characterized by compassion and open borders to 
migrants and asylum seekers of the last decade is now having second thoughts. Xenophobic 
fear of the outsider is coming into the social mainstream from the once far-right of the political 
spectrum as represented by the political party Alternative for Germany (AfD).361 This despite 
a demographic crisis in Germany (the minimum to keep labor supply stable from the present 
through 2050 requires a minimum increase of 500,000 people year over year) that is driving 
immigration to make up the difference in declining birth rates.362 Stoking this fear further is a 
cultural perception that Muslim migrants do not respect women’s rights as required by law or 
social custom.363 
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To overcome a darker past of Nazis in World War II and xenophobic violence of the 
latter Twentieth Century, Germany sought to be Europe’s moralistic leader in this most recent 
surge of Syrian refugees and MENA migrant influx. In the wake of the New Year’s Eve 
travesty though, this is proving more difficult for the German public to accept. An environment 
of two Germanys is emerging as evidenced by the AfD’s 2015 successes in elections to the 
European Parliament and within the eastern states of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia.364 
One environment being more worldly, liberal, and cosmopolitan; the other traditional, eastern-
oriented, and xenophobic. 
German public consciousness in the 1990s perceived migrants (Turks, Arabs, Balkans, 
Italians, and Spaniards) at fault for the mass unemployment sweeping across the country in the 
wake of German reunification. 365  The dividing line at that time was east against west 
(xenophobic attitudes remain strongest today still in eastern Germany), with the east 
overwhelmingly against migrants despite less than one percent residing there.366 Cities in the 
west were largely tolerant of migrants having housed the preponderance of them for the 
previous 30 years, though western provincial towns and the countryside did trend towards 
being more xenophobic.367 In this climate right wing radicalized youth (generally under age 
21) mobilized with silent backing of the public and commenced to wage war on migrants. 
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In 1991 only 40 violent acts against foreigners were logged, but that number soon rose 
to over four thousand in 1992.368 June of 1993 saw another 1,300 violent acts with new tactics 
now involving explosives and arson.369 The climax of this trend resulted in scores of migrant 
deaths during rioting and arson attacks in Hoyerswerda (September 1991), Hunxe (October 
1991), Rostock (August 1992), Molln (October 1992), and Solingen (May 1993).370 
The recent environment in Germany is akin to the 1990s except then there existed high 
unemployment and surplus labor; now the situation is one instead of a shortage in skilled 
workers, an aging population, and social welfare benefit shortfalls.371 Social attitudes within 
Germany have become more liberal in recent years; however, anxiety magnified from events 
such as the 2015 New Year’s Eve attacks across Germany have resulted in public fear and 
blame centralized on Muslim migrants.372 Transatlantic polling by the German Marshall Fund 
conducted in 2014 found Germans more favorable to their government’s handling of 
immigration (46 percent) as compared to the rest of Europe who largely disapproved (60 
percent) with a significant portion of the German population who still thought refugee policies 
should be less restrictive (31 percent).373 Adversely though there is a growing German minority 
                                                             
368 Ibid, 144.  
369 Ibid.  
370 Baumgartl and Adrian Favell, eds., new xenophobia in Europe, 143-44; Economist, Borderline 
cases: Saxon snapshots, December 5, 2002, 1, accessed March 3, 2017, 
http://www.economist.com/node/1464935; Juan Moreno, “Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany 




371 Moreno, “Welcoming the Refugees: Has Germany Really Changed,” 3. 
372 Ibid, 1-2.  
373 Transatlantic Trends Germany 2014: Country Profiles,” German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, 2014, accessed March 7, 2017, http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/country-
profiles-2014/country-profiles-germany-2014/; Transatlantic Trends, Transatlantic Trends: Key 
Findings 2014 (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014), 34, accessed March 8, 2017, 
http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf.  
96 
that resent migrant policies, evidenced by 51 percent of respondents concerned about 
immigration from outside the European Union and 41 percent who thought the most common 
reason for migrants coming to Germany was to seek social benefits.374 On the subject of social 
integration, polling respondents thought migrants were either integrating poorly (45 percent) 
or very poorly (7 percent), which was an increase in both categories from 2011 onwards.375 
Respondents lastly thought migrant parents were not integrating to German society very well; 
although, a combined 63 percent did perceive children of migrants as integrating either very 
well (5 percent), or well (58 percent), which was up from years earlier polling.376 
Dr. Oliver Decker, a noted German psychologist, sociologist, and philosopher 
interprets these diverging social trends in the recent publication German Perspectives on Right-
Wing Extremism by first noting that Germans overall are now (5.4 percent) much less right-
wing extremist and xenophobic than 13 years ago (9.7 percent).377 Decker opines that German 
reunification drove right-wing extremism in the 1990s, but today Germans are more pragmatic 
and feel that there are only two types of foreigners - “the useful and the useless. “378 Decker 
notes that German identity, and thereby citizens’ acceptance to foreigners, is inherently tied to 
the success of the economy and one being productive (useful) within the greater society.379 
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Integration occurs locally, not nationally and differs by city. The German capital Berlin 
struggles to integrate migrant enclave ghettos to the greater society following a history of 
haphazard social planning.380 Stuttgart however utilizes a strategic long-term approach under 
its Pact for Integration whereby it purposely sought to leverage the human capital of its 
migrant inhabitants, which included one-third its total population from 170 nations speaking 
over 120 languages.381 
Germany faces an unprecedented challenge of having to potentially integrate up to 
seven million migrants over the course of the next five years.382 Germany’s track record is not 
perfect in integrating migrants over the course of the Twentieth Century, with strategies and 
success varying by location and context. Stuttgart is among the highest of all German cities for 
its migrant population proportion (40 percent), especially when compared to Germany overall 
(12.9 percent).383 This case study analyzes the social strategies undertaken in Stuttgart that 
influence migrant and successive generation integration through the four factors of identity, 
policy, economics, and education. For context, each section contrasts Germany nationally to 
Stuttgart locally. The first section on identity delves into current German identity by analyzing 
associative sub-factors of segregation, discrimination, religion, and radicalization. The next 
section on policy explores the interplay between national (federal) integration policy 
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approaches and those executed locally within Stuttgart. The economics section then looks at 
how the sub-factors of employment, demography, and social mobility influence the success of 
migrant integration in Stuttgart. Finally, the education section investigates the role that 
training, public education, and industry skills needed drive the overall integration strategy as a 
forcing function. 
Identity Influences in Stuttgart 
Stuttgart is located in southern Germany and is the state capital of Baden- 
Wurttemberg. The city covers an area of 207 square kilometers and includes 23 different 
boroughs.384 Its population as of 2016 was 602,304 representing 170 different nationalities 
making it Germany’s sixth largest city.385 Stuttgart’s 2007’s population breakdown includes 
the cultural groups of ethnic German Spataussiedler (6.4 percent), naturalized Germans (10.9 
percent), foreigners (21 .3 percent), and Germans without a migration background (61.4 
percent).386 Cumulatively 38.5 percent of the total population has a migration background, with 
the largest percentage being Turks (17.1 percent), followed by Italians (10.7 percent), Greeks 
(10.7 percent), Croatians (9.8 percent), or ‘others’ (43.5 percent).387 
Stuttgart is a major hub for business, trade, and agriculture with a large presence from 
the automotive industry, science and technology fields, research and development, and even 
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the wine industry.388 Large international firms such as Daimler, Porsche, Bosch, and Hewlett-
Packard are major area employers. Industries such as these first recruited guest workers from 
southern Europe and Turkey beginning in 1955.389 In 1970, Stuttgart city leaders correctly 
assessed that recruited temporary migrant workers were not going home, but rather were 
settling permanently and bringing their families over.390 The same trend continued from that 
point forward through the Balkan War in the 1990s to the present with the local economy 
continually drawing migrants to the city.391 
Sustainable and Diverse Communities 
Segregation and an emergence of ethnic enclaves or ‘ghettos’ with high proportions of 
‘temporary’ migrant workers (predominantly Turks) became standard within German cities by 
the 1980s.392 In 1980, 41 percent of all non-Germans (naturalized Turks, Yugoslavs, Italians, 
Greeks, Spaniards, and Portuguese) resided in segregated areas where 12 percent or more of 
inhabitants were foreigners (no German citizenship; usually residing on residency permits).393 
This increased by the mid-1980s to where 45 percent of non-Germans and 49 percent of Turks 
lived in segregated enclaves.394 
Housing and urban policies ideally are constructed to combat segregation and social 
inequality. As disadvantaged neighborhoods develop and become more ethnically 
concentrated by migrants and successive generations, negative by-products often develop. 
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Socially, these by-products include creation of parallel societies with different identities and 
social norms, disadvantaged employment prospects, and negative influence on the quality of 
local education and hence impairment of social mobility.395 Structurally, spatial segregation 
limit individuals’ access to goods, services, and support institutions that deepen isolation from 
greater society.396 The combination of these social and infrastructural influences creates an 
ethnic mobility trap wherein migrants and successive generations look inwardly versus 
externally for social identity, employment, schooling, and communal support.397 
Scholars note that housing policies addressing or preventing these effects of 
segregation cannot be achieved in a piecemeal approach in individual boroughs; rather it takes 
a ‘grand’ strategy approach by building city infrastructure and applying social policies (labor 
market, income distribution, welfare policy) to society at large in order to reduce overall 
socioeconomic inequality.398 Cities undertaking this holistic approach are found only in some 
of the European CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policy) cities to include, 
Amsterdam, Vienna, Arnsberg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Breda. 399  Of these cities, ethnic 
segregation is lowest among the cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Arnsberg.400 
Stuttgart sought to limit negative by products early on since the 1970s in supporting 
initiatives to better integrate migrants and supporting their well-being. 401  This approach 
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resulted in no ghettoization of migrant background individuals in Stuttgart, despite the 
proportion of people without a German passport being the second highest (22.6 percent) among 
all German cities.402 Positive facets of this approach are evidenced in Stuttgart having the 
lowest crime rate of all metropolitan cities in Germany, unemployment among migrant origin 
individuals and successive generations being markedly lower than any other Germany city, 
and a thriving center for small business enterprises founded and run by migrants and their 
children.403 
The backbone to discouraging segregation and formation of ethnic enclaves in Stuttgart 
though is through the use of quotas and urban renewal. City policy mandates the use of quotas 
when assigning accommodation to “non-natives or vulnerable groups” which stipulates that 
“80% of tenants in a housing block should be from the EU, and a maximum of 20% may be 
citizens of third countries.”404 Urban renewal is a softer approach compared to the ‘hard’ 
approach of gentrification (often involving forced resettlement); this approach focuses on 
renovation and reconstruction- to retain middle- class residents and increasing buy-in through 
transparency and dialogue with the community from cradle to grave.405 
Affordable housing and home ownership are the last aspects to not only reducing 
segregation but also maintaining sustainable and diverse communities. The target of most 
support policies in Stuttgart is aimed at disadvantaged migrant origin individuals through either 
low-interest loans or public land obtained for less than market rate or government subsidized 
                                                             
402 Department of Integration, A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience (Stuttgart: Department 
of Integration, 2003), 6, accessed January 13, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-
integration/librarydoc/a-pact-for-integration-the-stuttgart-experience.  
403 Ibid.  
404 Housing and Integration of Migrants in Europe, 17. 
405 Ibid, 20.  
102 
housing allowances.406 Stuttgart, however, now -as in other major cities of New York, Berlin, 
London, and Paris -faces shortages of affordable housing that puts pressure on sustaining these 
two specific city policies, especially in regards to extended family housing needs for the recent 
influx of MENA migrant Muslims.407 As a city planner remarked, “It’s a crisis the refugees 
don’t create but make more acute.”408 
“House 49” is a sensible vignette to illustrate how Stuttgart enacted this strategic 
approach.409 Stuttgart’s old “North” train station over the previous 40 years became ever more 
international with approximately 50 percent of the population comprised of migrants and their 
children by the early 1980s.410 Middle-class residents began to move out, and problems of 
segregation and socioeconomic disadvantage became noticeable. Patrons, including the Robert 
Bosch Foundation and communities of the Protestant and Catholic churches, aimed to reverse 
the trend by establishing a community center in 1982 providing social and educational 
activities for the local community and better opportunities for at risk youth.411 By 1996, the 
community support center expanded its reach by providing additional services to all ages and 
all ethnicities: afternoon school support up to grade nine; youth activities in sports, art, and 
music; organized excursions to other parts of Stuttgart as well as outside the city; a job center 
and networking for apprenticeships; social support staffed by clinical social workers and 
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psychologists; and a language center for those learning or improving German.412 As a result, 
community crime rates dropped and residents were more connected.413 
Reducing Inequality through Equal Rights and Dialogue 
Germany’s acceptance of 1.1 million asylum seekers in 2015 dictates future social 
change.414 Studies show that structural change normally causes a splintering of social clusters 
into parts of three.415 The first group, not usually larger than 25 percent, eagerly accepts 
change.416 The second group, normally larger than the first, fears and hates any change to the 
status quo.417 The third group waits to see how change develops a new environment.418 The 
third group is neither belligerent nor inflexible, but are uneasy as change brings with it risk. In 
Germany this social effect can be seen where the first group welcomes all refugees and 
essentially represents the political left, while the second group is xenophobic, resents any 
foreign migrant admittance, and represents the growing far right. The third group is the 
political center in essence; they are the best chance for bolstering an environment of anti-
discrimination where migrants can best integrate. 
Building an environment of tolerance is difficult and contingent on social and economic 
stability of a nation’s inhabitants. Societies are less stable and prone to hate and xenophobia in 
times of recession and conflict e.g. Germany before, during, and after World War II; and during 
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economic recession and reunification from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s.419 For example, in 
1984, 13 percent of Germans and another 14 percent of non-Germans were living in poverty; 
however, at the same time up to 30 percent of Turks were also in poverty.420 This increased by 
1989 in the same categories to 17 percent of non-Germans and 38 percent of Turks. 421 
Comparing poverty and unemployment rates shows that from 1980 to 1994 unemployment 
among non-Germans rose faster than Germans, while the Turkish rate rose most sharply. The 
years with the highest rates of German unemployment show a relationship to the same years 








1980 3.5 4.8 6.3 
1985 8.7 13.1 14.8 
1990 6.6 10.0 10.0 
1994 8.8 15.5 18.9 
 
Table 4.1: Unemployment among Non-Germans and Turks (1980 - 1994) in %423 
 
Discrimination, xenophobia, and racism still exist in Germany, albeit at lower rates 
than the previous thirty years. Since the 1990s, political groups of the left (first group) and 
center (third group) have grown, while the far-right (second group) has contracted. Despite this 
change, attacks by ultra-conservatives against asylum and refugee centers in Germany 
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effectively doubled annually from 24 in 2012 to 58 in 2013, and then to 95 in 2014.424 
Discrimination in the post-9/11 era also qualifies as less focused on one certain minority such 
as the Turks, but rather against a wider religious swath of the Muslim population. A Pew 
Research Centre poll taken in Europe (Germany included) in 2014 found a median value of 46 
percent of respondents held anti-Muslim sentiments.425 This Islamophobia sentiment matches 
an increasing rate of hate-attacks against Mosques of 35 in 2012 and 36 in 2013 compared to 
the former annual average rate of 22 from 2001 to 2011.426 
Intergroup relations between Germans with and without a migration background are 
markedly better in Stuttgart than in the majority of areas in Germany. The twin aspects of 
integrating efforts dating back to the 1970s and 38.5 percent of the present population give 
Stuttgart a marked advantage.427  Interviews with Stuttgart resident migrant origin groups 
undertaken in February 2009 remarkably did not note discrimination as a major issue; rather 
other tangential needs of education, housing, and employment were top priorities. 428 
Researchers from the University of Bamberg conducting the interviews note however a 
bifurcation between ‘older’ (established migrant orthodox churches and communities) and 
‘newer’ (less established Muslim communities) migrant groups. 429  The ‘newer’ Muslim 
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groups reported discrimination when applying for apprenticeships or jobs, and by women 
wearing headscarves.430 
Stuttgart made reducing discrimination and increasing positive intergroup relations a 
priority in 1998 when it first founded its Forum of Cultures as a “roof organization of non-
German cultural organizations and intercultural institutions.”431 The Forum expanded from 16 
organizations in 1998 to 62 member organizations in 2009 representing more than 50 nations; 
an Intercultural Bureau is charged with counseling and organizing dialogue and exchange 
opportunities.432 To further increase intercultural exchange, the Forum started distributing a 
magazine Intercultural Stuttgart: Encounter of Cultures on a monthly basis in 2001 with 
circulation growing to 18,000 free copies to migrant and cultural societies, public institutions, 
social groups, and even restaurants and commercial stores.433 
Stuttgart allocates five percent of the city budget to cultural affairs, demonstrating the 
city’s priority to improving equal rights, reducing discrimination, and harnessing culture for 
the betterment of the city.434 In 2008, Stuttgart’s Cultural Affairs annual operating budget was 
€110 million, with €28 million allocated to cultural funding and €377,000 to the intercultural 
department. 435  Separate from the funding of individual projects annually, four Forum 
organizations receive direct funding from the city: the Forum of Cultures (€193,000), the 
German-Turkish Forum (€100,000), the German- American Centre (€57,500), and the Institute 
for Foreign Cultural Relations (€350,000).436 
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Diversity in Stuttgart is regarded as normal with little discrimination or conflict 
between ethnic groups being experienced or reported in public life (school, workplaces, in 
public areas).437 Yet, interracial marriages or intercultural events (conferences, festivals, etc.) 
involving two or more migrant organizations with different racial backgrounds is still 
infrequent.438 The religious community consisting of different ethnic and/or denominational 
leaders (Christian, Muslim or otherwise) meet regularly to improve on the latter aspects and 
reduce potential for conflict through increasing communication and cooperation between 
groups.439  
Islamic Identify 
In March of 2012, Germany’s Interior Ministry issued a study detailing Muslim 
sentiment and attitudes towards integration.440  A sizeable Muslim minority of 20 percent 
expressed skepticism to ever integrating fully or successfully to German society. 441 More 
alarmingly was one subgroup of Muslims, aged 14 to 32, who identified as being both ‘strictly 
religious’ and hostile to the west.442 Among Muslims with German citizenship, this group ratio 
was 15 percent; among non-citizens it jumped to almost a quarter of the group’s population 
(24 percent).443 
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German news media outlets were quick to seize on the racial/religious stereotypes 
within the report for headlines and sales, but tended to not analytically dig deeper into the 
report itself. One aspect the media missed was that polling and interviews were conducted 
during an ongoing national debate on Thilo Sarrazin ‘s 2010 Muslim-critical book Deutsch/and 
schaffl sich ab (Germany abolishes itself).444 Even in an Islamophobically charged atmosphere 
though, more than 78 percent of respondents had a positive view towards integration, to include 
more than fifty percent of those without citizenship.445 
In recent years, national statistics demonstrate that Germany is making progress in 
integrating four million Muslims. The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees estimated in 
2009 that the Muslim population in Germany ranged between 3.8 to 4.3 million people or 4.6 
to 5.2 percent of 82 million.446 Approximately 45 percent of this number are German nationals 
and the rest (55 percent) are foreign nationals.447 Surprisingly, many of the migrants (prior to 
2011 Syrian war migrant exodus) were not even Muslim or were not very religious. For 
example, 40 percent of Iranian migrants claimed no religious affiliation, while many others 
from Islamic countries such as Iraq were non-Islamic religious minorities.448 
Muslims in Germany are not a heterogeneous group; the largest proportion of the 
Muslim population are those with Turkish ancestry at an estimated 2.5 to 2.7 (63 percent) 
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million individuals. 449  Larger representative Islamic denominations include Sunnis (74 
percent), Shiites (7 percent), and Alevis (13 percent).450 Though the majority of all Muslims in 
Germany are religious (86 percent), religiosity varies by migrant country of origin and 
denomination with Turks and North Africans being more religious, while a third of Iranians 
“claim to have no religious faith at all.”451 Furthermore, subsequent generations of Muslims in 
Germany show a tendency of being less religious evidenced by rates of headscarf wear among 
the second generation dropping seven percent.452 Finally integration - as reported on the survey 
- is progressing well with challenges grouped around language and structural integration 
(employment, housing), while social integration is reported much more positively than 
commonly assumed.453 In this manner, the national survey indicated that “mass phenomena” 
events (abstaining from coed swimming classes, sex education, or wear of the hijab) affected 
only a minority of the German Muslim population.454 
Germany’s constitution (called the Basic Law) is the foundation for integrating migrant 
Muslims in Germany as it “‘guarantees freedom religious worship, organization, and 
teaching.”455 The law is interpreted as not being laicist in the French or Dutch sense, but rather 
religion neutral or not taking an official position concerning religion.456 It is an important 
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distinction because the framework does not rigidly separate state and religion. The arrangement 
maintains a sphere for dialogue and mutual support and mitigates creation of illegitimate or 
radical denominations.457 
Structurally, this arrangement allows for coordination and cooperation between two 
entities by allowing churches to be public corporations with associative tax aids.458  This 
enables the state to collect a “church tax” from members of the places of worship and then 
disburses the amount back to the churches after deducting a small administrative charge.459 
Socially, this creates legitimate collaborative space for public- private partnerships (forums) 
to increase cooperation. At the national level, the best example of this is the German Islam 
Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz or DIK) convened in 2006 to increase social 
integration and constructive dialogue between federal, state, and local governments and 
German Muslim organizations.460 The DIK from 2006 to the present focused its effort on a 
wide range of issues of importance to both Muslims and German majority society: no tolerance 
for domestic violence and forced marriage; preventing youth radicalization and deviant 
behavior; embedding the DIK to greater society; promoting institutional cooperation and 
integration; gender equality; preventing extremism and social polarization; promoting 
consensus on values to drive integration; religion-based issues in school; media and Islam; 
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security and Islamism; living as a Muslim in the German social system; and Islam practices 
pursuant to article several of the Basic Law.461 
Stuttgart approached interreligious dialogue through its ‘Roundtable of Religions,’ 
which was established in October 2003 prior to the national German Islamic Conference.462 
Wolfgang Schuster, the lord mayor of Stuttgart, established the roundtable with the aim of 
mitigating misunderstanding and conflict among the city’s religious communities, which 
prominently included representatives from the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, 
the Turkish-Islamic Union, the communities of the Baha’i, Bosnian Islamic, Israelite, and 
Buddhist.463 Twenty of the religious denominations signified their commitment by publishing 
a ‘Manifesto for a peaceful and active cooperation of the religions in Stuttgart. 464  The 
manifesto highlighted positive aspects to the variety of cultures in Stuttgart and pledged that 
peaceful living is everyone’s responsibility.465 
The Muslim segment of this coalition is increasingly heterogeneous beyond the longer-
residing Turkish majority population. As in many other areas of Germany, public impression 
of Islam in the post-9/11 world is a politically skewed version where migrant origin individuals 
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are progressively perceived by their religion rather than their ethnicity. For illustration, prior 
to 9/11, a Turkish heritage individual was viewed as a Turk; now he/she is perceived as a 
Muslim.466 In this context, Muslims in Stuttgart report higher rates of discrimination than other 
minorities, especially in areas of housing, employment, and education.467 
Stuttgart’s Pact for Integration was designed to apply integration policy equally to all 
residents in Stuttgart, irrespective of background, race, religion, or gender.468 Despite this, city 
leaders realized that a gap was forming in respect to the Muslim community and implemented 
several measures to disrupt Muslim individuals or organizations from avoiding integration. 
Three specific practices were all implemented after 2001. The first measure undertaken by the 
city was ‘Intercultural opening up and qualification of Muslim associations in Stuttgart’ - in 
short known as the ‘Islam Project.’ The goal of this initiative was similar to that of the national 
German Islam Conference, by opening up Islamic associations in Stuttgart to the larger 
community and the city’s integration ventures. 469  The second initiative was focused on 
increasing cooperation between police and mosque associations. Stuttgart police were one of 
the first of the city to begin direct coordination with Islamic associations in 2003. 470  A 
strengthened enterprise in 2008 sought for police to gain greater intercultural competence 
concerning Islam and develop stronger Muslim contacts; this included partnering with mosque 
associations in community crime prevention to better integrate mosques and members to the 
larger Stuttgart community.471 
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The last initiative began integrating Islamic instruction into public schools to gain 
parity with Catholic and Protestant religious classes already taught in all states of Germany.472 
A pilot project began in partnership with the state of Baden-Wurttemberg, which targeted 12 
primary schools, or approximately 230 children.473 Two of the schools were located in Stuttgart 
and included roughly 100 Muslim students who participated and received two hours of 
religious instruction weekly.474 The religious instruction taught general and specific Islamic 
practices, but also emphasized shared values with other faiths. Curriculum was standardized 
and all taught in German from state certified teachers.475 
Preventing Migrant Radicalization 
Mainstream mosques of Germany today suffer the same dwindling congregations as 
Catholic and Protestant churches.476 Both are seen as rigidly traditional and out of touch with 
everyday life.477 In this social gap the fundamentalist - often radical - Salafist sect of Islam has 
gained prominence rapidly with disaffected young people across Germany. Young Salafist 
imams in their thirties preach anti-western fundamentalist sermons, which resonates especially 
with second and third generation migrant origin Muslim men.478 
At the national level, preventing at risk Muslim youth and individuals from sliding into 
extremist ideology is a major topic and goal of the German Islam Conference. Working groups 
                                                             
472 Ibid, 33.  
473 Ibid.  
474 Ibid.  
475 Ibid. 
476 Matthias Bartsch, Maximillan Popp, and Christoph Scheuermann, “A Growing Following in 
Germany: The Dangerous Success of Radical Young Clerics, “Spiegel, February 22, 2012, 1, 
accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de.international/germany/a-growing-following-in-
germany-the-dangerous-success-of-radical-young-clerics-a-816642.html.  
477 Ibid.  
478 Ibid.  
114 
from 2009 to 2012 all specifically addressed the need for further research and action related to 
preventing Muslim radicalization and especially Muslim youth radicalization.479 At the local 
level in Stuttgart, the city began addressing this and other related issues in 1997 under its 
program of ‘A Safe and Clean Stuttgart,’ which involves the three partners of the city, the 
police through its specialist Criminal and Traffic Prevention division, and citizens’ 
organizations.480 
The program is broadly based and targeted to the following ten areas: fostering positive 
social politics as a preventative measure; safety partnership covering all areas of life and 
population groups; children’s safety; the Pact for Integration; prevention through sport; 
preventing against and fighting juvenile delinquency; traffic safety in public areas; public 
transport safety; safety and cleanliness; and preventing crime and urban development.481 The 
lack of Muslim or other extremist ideology attacks in 
Stuttgart suggests the program is working, especially as it targets underlying conditions 
that breed Muslim Islamist tendencies. This specifically includes a focus on areas of lessening 
or preventing poverty and segregation as well as implementing youth programs that offer 
meaningful leisure activities, such as with the ‘Prevention through sports’ project of 
‘Basketball at midnight.’ 482  Finally, Stuttgart’s ‘Safe and Clean’ program is also 
interconnected to other religious outreach efforts discussed earlier, such as the ‘Intercultural 
opening up and qualification of mosque associations in Stuttgart’ and the ongoing cooperation 
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between police and mosque associations.483 The program is comprehensive between the city 
and outside vested civic partners by empowering Muslim communities within Stuttgart to the 
means for betterment and preventions of youth radicalization. 
Migrant Integration Policy Efforts in Stuttgart 
The German approach to migrant integration is systematically organized, decentralized 
to empower all government levels nation-wide, and focused long-term policy toward second 
and third-generation immigrants. 484  The German National Integration Plan (NIP) 
acknowledges Germany as a country of immigration representing “15 million people from 200 
different countries ... [and] after the USA, Germany has the highest share of migrants in any 
population world-wide.” The National Integration Plan lists its two guiding principles as 
“preparedness of the immigrants to embrace life in our [German] country” and that the 
endeavor being the “responsibility of the entire society.”485 Key targets of the plan are: 
Improving integration courses; promoting the Germany language right from the start; 
ensuring good education and training, improving employment opportunities; improving the 
life and situation of women and girls, implementing equal rights; supporting on-site 
integration; living in cultural diversity; promoting integration through sports; making use of 
the media – diversity; strengthening integration through civic commitment and equal 
participation; science – open-minded.486 
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Of the seven separate key objectives outlined to the Federal German States of the 
National Integration Plan, six include education or training as points of emphasis.487 German 
commitment is evidenced by the amount of government agencies involved, to include: the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI), the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, BAMF), the Federal 
Police, Foreigners Authorities of the Federal States, Federal Employment Agency, Diplomatic 
Missions, and a plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGO).488 Furthermore, national 
trends point to a constant upgrading of local integration policies in line with federal policy 
which generally includes the following: institution of integration courses that combine German 
language instruction with orientation courses; creation and implementation of a system of 
quantifiable indicators for successful integration nationwide; a new anti-discrimination law 
passed in 2006; linking migration to integration policy (spouses joining husbands required to 
pass German orientation course for visa); and the foundation and continued support to the 
German Islam Conference.489 Finally, the legal framework regarding migration policies in 
Germany is robust to include the Nationality Act (last amended 13 November 2014), the 
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Residence Act (published 30 July 2004), the Asylum-Procedure Act (published 2 September 
2008), and the Passport Act (last attended 20 July 2007).490 
In the 1980s, Germany began an active role of integrating its migrant population. The 
deliberative and long-term strategic vision of this trend separates it from much the rest of 
Europe who by and large took a passive and segregated approach. Specific legislative 
milestones that define Germany in the last decade include: 
• Passage of the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in 2005 
• Establishment of the German Islam Conference in 2006 
• Development of the National Integration plan in 2007 
• Development of a First Progress Report in 2008 
• Development of a Nationwide Integration Program in 2010 
• Regular integration summits held by the federal chancellor’s office 
 
Policy work and public consensus clarify what Germans perceive to be the benchmarks 
of migrant integration success: Germany language proficiency, achieving acceptable levels of 
education or job training programs for labor market entry, and acceptance of mainstream 
cultural values and norms by ethnic Germans.491 
In sum, from a strategic policy standpoint, Germany’s planning and program 
implementation to migrant integration employs a systemic governmental approach with 
national guidelines, but locally executed; federal institutions empower state and local 
governments to enable flexible policies pursuant to resident conditions, promote transparency 
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and equality at all levels, and employ education and training as key directives to drive 
integration success.492 For example, the Stuttgart’s mayor’s office began integrating migrants 
in the city more than thirty years ago.493 Since then, the local government continued the same 
emphasis in crafting and implementing city policies that were inclusive to migrants.494 An 
emphasis on migrant inclusion by city leaders paid dividends to the region’s vibrant 
employment sector to ensure a steady supply of young workers as well as equality for a large 
migrant origin population.495 
Integration policies of the city are crafted to be inclusive to the entire population rather 
than specifically targeted to one group. This includes the areas of education, employment, 
housing, and even outreach (Forum of Cultures); emphasis is placed on ensuring equality to 
all peoples and groups. The city’s Integration Department is charged with initiating any policy 
program and is given a large amount of leeway to this end.496 The department’s expertise is 
reliant on a network of stakeholders throughout the city’s migrant and religious organizations 
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and associations. Funding for specific policies through the Integration Department is a mix 
between city funding and cost sharing with stakeholders, private groups, and non-
governmental groups.497 
Another unique partner in Stuttgart is the importance that the state (Baden-
Württemberg) places on migrant integration as shown by being the only state in Germany with 
a Ministry of Integration.498 The collaboration between city and state is important for resource 
sharing, regional coordination, and statistical monitoring and progress reporting. Finally, 
Stuttgart is active in multiple horizontal exchanges with other cities promoting progressive 
integration policies. These include the ‘Quality Circle for local integration policy’ (a network 
of 30 separate German cities) and the European Network CLIP of 35 cities and various 
institutions promoting innovative solutions to migrant integration.499 
Stuttgart’s Pact for Integration is the modern-day cornerstone for all the city’s efforts 
concerning migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The pact is top-down process, but reliant 
on partnership with the private sector, non-governmental actors, and community 
associations.500 The pact is a two-way process that is as much bottom-up as top-down. The 
three goals of the pact include: promoting equal opportunity and participation for all 
individuals in all segments of the population; promoting peaceful coexistence and social 
inclusion of all groups and people; and capitalizing on the city’s cultural diversity to “extend 
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the personal and professional competencies of everyone within the international municipal 
society.”501 These goals are achieved moreover through 12 fields of activity: 
1. Language training for new migrants 
2. Language and education for preschool instruction 
3. Equal opportunity in school and education 
4. Integration in the labor market 
5. Cultural orientation of city administration 
6. Integration and participation within city districts 
7. Urban planning and housing policies for integration 
8. Intercultural and international orientation of culture, economy, and science 
9. Stuttgart’s Partnership for safety and security 
10. Religious dialogue 
11. Political participation 
12. Public relations and media502 
 
The Pact for Integration has been a great success within Germany as well as 
internationally. First implemented in 2001, upgraded versions were rolled out in 2007 and 
again in 2009.503 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
awarded Stuttgart its ‘Cities for Peace Prize’ in 2004 and shortly thereafter the Council of 
Europe adopted a majority of the pact for inclusion to its official policy to integration. 
The Economics of Mass Migration 
Politicians and government bureaucrats struggle with the needs and wants of any 
society. In Germany, modern society needs either a high birthrate to sustain its current 
population, or alternatively younger healthy migrant workers. The migrants’ macro role is to 
supplement the population to drive the economy and fill out the base of the country’s 
population pyramid in order to support the middle and elder age demographics and associative 
social welfare programs. The wants of Germany are more multi-faceted. A million people is a 
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lot for one country to take in, especially in the span of a single year. In January of 2016, 44 
members of German’s parliament sent a letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel rejecting her 
acceptance of so many migrants stating, ‘Our country is about to be overwhelmed.” 504 
Depending on the year, political trends, and current affairs finds Germans mixed as to how 
many migrants should be accepted and for what specific reasons. 
Germany can easily absorb the number of accepted migrants with little economic 
impact. A study by Oxford University’s Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen of the Bank of 
England found that immigration would have only a slightly negative impact on wages (2 
percent) and then only to the most unskilled workers in Germany (likely other recent 
migrants).505 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also estimated that refugees in the short-
term (2016-2017) would add 0.35 percent GDP expenditure for those given years.506 This 
results in short-term unemployment increases, wages being depressed for low-skill workers, 
and additional public debt. Those with displaced jobs, however, are more likely to be rehired 
in other less menial jobs (flexible upward inability to middle skill and professional) with higher 
wages; long term, the migrants also boost annual GDP output by 0.3 percent.507 
As of April 2016, there were 1.76 million people (4.2 percent) in Germany unemployed 
of a total population of 81.8 million.508 Despite these numbers many businesses in Germany 
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are in dire need of workers -especially in middle skill labor positions accessible through 
apprenticeship programs open to legal migrants. As a result, Germany is dependent on 
immigration of migrants and refugees external to the European Union or internal to the 28-
member nation block.509 There are 46 million (46.007) people of working age in Germany, but 
without immigration that number drops to less than 29 million in approximately 30 years’ 
time.510  Further exacerbating the problem is that the despite the headlines of 1.1 million 
refugee migrants entering Germany, the majority of immigrants to Germany are actually 
sourced from within the 28 member EU-nation bloc.511 However in the future, Germany will 
become even more reliant on external-EU migrant labor given that all European Union nations 
are suffering from the same birth rate declines and soon will have minimal excess labor to 
emigrate.512 
For any migrant, mastery of the German language and attaining baseline educational 
and vocational skills are paramount to successfully entering the labor market.513 Migrants do 
not normally possess many of these skills upon arrival in the host country. Migrants are 
technically allowed to work; however, in order to enroll in a government subsidized integration 
course (language, training, and education), the migrant needs to have legal residency status, 
which can take months to years for government bureaucracy to determine.514 
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Employers know this and must weigh the cost-benefits of hiring someone who could 
be deported if their applicable (asylum or immigration application) status is ineligible. For this 
reason, refugee migrants are a much higher short-term burden to Germany than other legal 
migrants by drawing more heavily on welfare usage, while not paying back into the same 
system through employment.515 A majority of research shows that refugee short-term pressure 
declines to the economy and dependency to welfare reverses the longer a migrant works in the 
host country through tax contributions to the economy and social welfare.516 
Immigration is not guaranteed to save Germany from its demographic crisis. Fertility 
rates of migrants in the first generation are generally higher, but various studies point to future 
migrant birth rates falling over time.517 If Germany maintains a net annual immigration rate of 
250,000, the population would still shrink to 66.1 million in 2050 and 50 million in 2100.518 
Current migrant immigration estimates to Germany are in excess of one million annually 
through 2020.519 
Finally, Germany is actively selecting certain skill sets for immigration: low skill 
laborers with the ability to be trained internally, middle skill individuals or those with some 
education, and high-skill professionals from Organization for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) countries.520 The effort is strategically planned and implemented in the 
                                                             
515 European Migration Network (EMN), The Impact of Immigration on Germany’s Society.  
516 Ibid, 18-20. 
517 Ibid, 19.  
518 Ibid.  
519 Spiegel, The Integration Puzzle: What a Million Refugees Mean for Everyday Life, 10.  
520 Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider, Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration in Germany, 1-
80; Michael Vollmer, Determining Labour Shortages and the need for Labour Migration in 
Germany: Focus-Study by the Germany National Contact Point for the European Migration Network 





German federal government, with regular status reports by key agencies of the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fur Arbeit, BA), 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Bundeminsterium fur Arbeit und Sociales, 
BMAS), and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium.fur Bildung 
und Forschung, BMBF).521 
Comparing this to the local level, Stuttgart’s unemployment rate for all residents was 
reported to be 5.7 percent in 2007, which was significantly better than Germany’s overall 
average of 8.91 percent.522 For non-German foreigners though the rate doubled to 11.4 percent 
of foreigners comprising 36.5 percent of the 27,752 unemployed total people in Stuttgart at 
that time period.523 For those foreigners employed, a large percentage were low-skill laborers 
to include 33 percent of all laborers in Stuttgart and eight percent of office clerks.524 Stuttgart’s 
rate of foreigners unemployed are lower than other major German metropolitan areas 
(Reference table 4.2 below). With the notable exception of Bavaria, which has a lower 
proportion of foreign population (10.3 versus 12.6 percent), Stuttgart has both the lowest total 
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population and foreigner population unemployment rate of all major populated areas in 















6.4 6.52 14.6 16.07 
Berlin 10.7 10.7 21.4 22.6 
Hamburg 7.5 7.5 16.0 16.9 
Munich 
(Bavaria) 





8.0 8.0 20.5 21.95 
Frankfurt 
(Hesse) 




3.8 3.92 8.8 9.62 
Table 4.2 Unemployment Rates (Average) for Total Population and Foreigners by Highest 
Populated Cities and Regions (2015 - 2016) in %526 
 
To achieve these rates at a sustained basis, Stuttgart began with its own executive 
offices within city employment, which employed 1,219 (10 percent) foreigners in 2007.527 As 
with other areas, the majority of these individuals are in low-skill ‘manual grade’ categories of 
employment. Regardless, the city places a high priority on equal opportunity employment, 
diversity, intercultural competence, and language and vocational training.528 These aspects 
become critical for city employees at frontline areas implementing the city’s Pact for 
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Integration’s 12 fields of activity.529 The Pact’s 12 fields of activity collectively form the basis 
of labor market integration for migrants through the preparatory skills of education (language 
and school) and training (vocational and apprenticeship). 
Education Drives Integration 
Space for students in classrooms and schools is not a problem in Germany. Without the 
latest influx of Syrian and Afghan refugees of 2015, the total number of students across 
Germany was expected to decline more than ten percent over the next decade according to 
government estimates.530 At first glance, the educational system in Germany is not well suited 
to migrants. Compared to other western countries where preschool at age three is the norm, 
German children start relatively late at four or five years old.531 At age ten, students are then 
guided into either a vocational or academic track and once begun it is very difficult to change 
from one to the other. Critics of the system point to statistics showing a 44 percentage higher 
likelihood of migrant children (second generation or later) being placed in vocational rather 
than academic tracks, though this is not negatively perceived within the German educational 
system.532 Older migrant children who lack German language proficiency are also generally 
integrated into the vocational side. 
Despite these perceived shortcomings, Germany’s national educational system has its 
merits and shows statistical promise long-term concerning migrants’ inclusion and upward 
mobility. For second and later generation migrants sending their children to early education 
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programs of nurseries and kindergarten, statistics point towards an increasing parity to ethnic 
Germans by the rate of 73.5 percent in 2007 to 84 percent in 2008.533 This mirrors secondary 
and later schooling results with more second or later generation migrant children achieving 
qualification at intermediate and advanced levels (post high school).534 Despite positive gains, 
high school dropouts are twice as high among migrant origin youth as ethnic Germans (13.3 
versus 6.6 percent) and vocational training apprenticeships are an average of 17 months rather 
than three months for those with German backgrounds.535 
Germany is taking note of these unique challenges to migrant children - either newly 
arrived or already resident - and are viewing them as an opportunity to be capitalized on rather 
than squandered. School hours are being extended, and the federal government is making large 
investments to all states in earlier preschool education.536 In response, mathematics scores for 
second-generation migrants has improved by the equivalent of an extra year of school.537 
Finally, consider the skill sets and demographics flooding into Germany between 2011 
and 2016. Syrian refugees account for a sizeable percentage of the numbers (307,192 Syrians 
of a total l, 006,755 UNHCR asylum applications) and of those the UNHCR states around half 
have university degrees.538 Syrian professionals - those with advanced educations, others with 
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middle and high-skill professions, and those with the financial ability to do so - began fleeing 
Syria early on in the conflict, which mirrors spikes in UNHCR asylum applications evidenced 
beginning as early as 2010 and accelerating through 2015.539 Even in an UNHCR survey 
conducted of Syrian arrivals to Greek Islands in January of 2016, demonstrated that 27 percent 
of all respondents were students (88 percent interrupted their studies to flee with university the 
most common) and another 29 percent were university graduates.540 These individuals brought 
skills with them as shown by primary occupations reported in service sectors (18 percent), 
students (13 percent), manufacturing (9 percent), and construction (8 percent).541 
Studies across the European Union stress the importance that education plays to 
migrant integration particularly in successfully entering the labor market and becoming a 
value-added citizen to society. The European Commission’s third edition of the Handbook on 
Integration lays out eight key areas for the policy maker to consider: host nation language 
training; access to primary and secondary education; removing biases (e.g. concentration of 
minorities or passive segregation); resource allocation and support; training and recruiting 
teachers for diverse environments; outreach to parents; afterschool assistance; and facilitating 
the transition to higher education and the labor market (vocational education and training).542 
Stuttgart for its part attributes to an education focus the first four of twelve fields of activity 
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within the Pact for Integration. These include: language training for newly arrived and 
established immigrants, language and education support in preschool education, equal 
opportunities in schools and education, and integration and the labor market. 543  Stuttgart 
regards education and training as critical for its Pact for Integration to be effective. The city’s 
long-term mandate is to raise educational achievement among all migrant youth as well as 
increase access to university attendance.544 
Stuttgart organizes migrant integration education focused to two groups. First are the 
migrant students still young enough to benefit from the German school system and second are 
the older adults who did not go through the system.545 Both tracks are open to both recently 
arrived migrants (refugees, asylum seekers) and German resident migrants of second or later 
generation. In addition to the city’s courses are those also offered and funded by the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees.546 
The city organizes and funds its standalone language training to be district based.547 
Instruction is offered to both residents of migration background and recently arrived migrants. 
Participants in the course pay a modest €50 fee for the entire 150 unit courses which include 
day care and is located in convenient areas for residents.548 The courses are focused on daily 
life and useful tasks - filling out forms, making appointments, using public transportation, and 
paying bills.549  The courses have proven to be very successful by Stuttgart having more 
integration and language support instruction to migrants than any other German city, with 75 
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percent of participants being women, many other participants stating on evaluation surveys 
that they were more confident in daily civic life as a result of the courses, and an 80 percent 
attendance rate at subsequent advanced courses.550 
Migrant origin individuals’ access to education and future labor upward mobility is 
reliant foremost on their competence of the German language. Stuttgart tackles this most 
important task through a four pronged approach: first for children at young ages in preschool 
and kindergarten; secondly to students in primary and secondary schooling; thirdly as 
graduates transitioning to the labor market; and finally for adults.551 All migrant children in 
Stuttgart are provided the opportunity of preschool and kindergarten as early as age three, 
which is important as research shows the earlier that children are introduced to a second 
language the quicker they learn with the higher likelihood of mastering it.552 
To encourage mothers and parents to enroll children in early childhood education and 
increase dialogue, the city conducts outreach programs such as ‘Einstein in the nursery,’ ‘Mum 
Learns German,’ ‘Seminars for Parents’ (Elternseminar), and even sources private donations 
for breakfast to underprivileged children.553 The purpose of the outreach programs are to 
empower migrant mothers and fathers through language and support to their children’s 
education with the additional benefit of community socialization. Elternsemminar’s success 
can be seen by its longevity (established in 1963) and serving as a community focal point 
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between parents and the school community regardless of race, ethnicity or cultural 
orientation.554 
Stuttgart ensures language instruction and integration courses are readily available for 
parents as well. German courses for parents are organized through a number of different 
schools in the evenings with related themes based on the German education system and how 
to be successful in primary and secondary schools.555 In this manner parents are not just 
learning German language, but also receiving knowledge on the systems, process, and cultural 
background of the Stuttgart school system. 
Equality and diversity in the Stuttgart educational setting are stressed to ensure the best 
possible chance for every student to graduate from secondary school and go on to a successful 
professional life. To this end, the city seeks collaboration between students, parents, and 
teachers. For the part of the city, Stuttgart encourages teachers to increase their own individual 
cultural capacities and intercultural competencies. To facilitate this, the city organizes 
instruction from expert lecturers on topics ranging from education of migrant families to legal 
situations and solutions.556 The city also manages regular teacher conferences organized to 
varying cultural training seminars.557 
To increase intercultural communication, multilingual documentation and educational 
aides (English, Greek, Italian, and Turkish) are available for students and parents and the city 
regularly partners on select ventures with outside organizations such as the German-Turkish 
Forum. 558  Example projects to this end include school curriculums oriented to different 
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cultures (involving a variety of different city organizations), or an essay contest for 9th graders 
organized by the Stuttgart city council with the topic of: “What does it mean for me to have 
friends from another culture?”559 Lastly, youth outreach and mentorship programs such as 
‘Integration through Sport’ are an excellent example of highlighting diversity and building 
community bonds through universally enjoyed activities of recreation.560 
‘Individual Learning’ and ‘Clear Start’ (Startklar) - both supported through the 
Mercator Foundation -commonly organize 100 or more area teachers and 75 volunteers to 
teach supplementary classes in math, German, and English to approximately 500 students to 
help prepare them for the upper levels of school or transition to apprenticeship.561 
Migrants who are part of the city’s integration orientation are matched to individual 
programs, which are supported by approximately 80 different city organizations and normally 
involve a high proportion of language instruction.562 Matching migrant to individual program 
initially entails being assigned to one of four primary city fields of action: first are the specific 
qualification measures in conjunction with language; second is consultation and qualification; 
third self-employment; and fourth the “u25-support-system for graduates with low or no 
qualifications.”563 Once tracked, the ‘municipal Jobcentre’ and/or Youth Welfare Office (for 
those in the u25 track) provides support and services between migrants and the job market 
through a variety of programs and support agencies. 564  These include one-year track 
preparatory programs for regular apprenticeship within the German “dual system of 
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professional education;” or individuals can refine their skill set with on the job training 
programs with area companies (JUMP program).565  Unemployed migrants can utilize the 
program ‘Work instead of Welfare’ offering language training and job qualification.566 For 
women, there are special programs such as MIQUAS or QUASIE (European Union supported) 
or the Italian-Croat-Turkish program KOLBRI (also EU supported); all focused on language 
and socialization skills to empower migrant women.567 
Job training programs in the city are designed to leverage the skills migrants bring with 
them from their previous professions, which benefits both the individual and the city. 
Moreover, education and training translate to increase in social mobility potential, which also 
benefits migration background individuals and the city. Finally, the variety and viability of so 
many programs are a direct reflection of Stuttgart’s unemployment rate among migrants, which 
is among the lowest in German metropolitan cities.568 
Concluding Remarks 
Germany lies at a crossroads in the modern era. One is presented with an image of two 
Germanys - one future-oriented, bright, and hopeful; the other rooted in the past, as dark, and 
xenophobic. Research from the case study points to evidence that Germany overall and 
Stuttgart specifically are taking progressive steps in the direction of becoming ever more 
inclusionary and multicultural in policy as well as in social actuality. German social norms of 
acceptance tied to usefulness bode well for successful migrant integration long-term given 
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Germany’s demographic challenges and shrinking labor market pool. Finally, Stuttgart’s 
archetypal Pact for Integration recognizes and capitalizes on the numerous advantages of a 
diverse population by recruiting and harnessing resident human capital to serve the 
advancement of the city. This case study identified the social strategies undertaken in Stuttgart 
that influenced migrant and successive generation integration through the four factors of 
identity, policy, economics, and education. Of the four factors employed, Stuttgart presents an 
environment where strategic vision to long-term planning and policy are integral to achieving 
effective migrant integration over successive generations. 
Evidence and examples provided within the identity factor’s section point to Stuttgart’s 
long-term approach to crafting and implementing inclusive policies to segregation, 
discrimination, and inequality of the city’s population. For this reason, Stuttgart did not witness 
the same phenomena as Berlin in respect to ghettoization and segregation of migrant 
populations and associative second and third order effects of crime, racism, and inter-ethnic 
violence. In respect to religion, German federal structural conditions allowed under its 
constitution (Basic Law) enabled secularity to be interpreted as religion neutral and thereby 
able to create legal spheres for dialogue and mutual support between church/mosque and state, 
while also mitigating illegitimate and radical denominations. Socially, this fashioned lawful 
collaborative space for public-private partnerships (forums) to flourish. Stuttgart leveraged this 
legalistic aspect and strengthened its own strategic approach by increasing intercultural and 
interreligious dialogue and collaboration through forum organizations, collective endeavors, 
and cooperative goals. In this manner the city partnered with Muslim and other religious 
communities for preventing youth radicalization through comprehensive civic approaches 
rather than solely focusing on it being a radical Islamist issue. 
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Stuttgart’s integration policies are crafted to be inclusive to the entire population rather 
than specifically targeted to one group. The city leaders realized early on in the 1970s through 
the 1990s that in order for integration policies to be effective they would have to be 
comprehensive across all sectors of government. 569  Taking a piecemeal approach simply 
would not work. Only during the process of collaborating simultaneously with all different 
sectors of government, business, and communities did Stuttgart learn the value that could 
potentially be gained by harnessing its available resident human capital.570 With these aspects 
central in mind, Stuttgart’s Pact for Integration was founded in 2001. Results from that point 
to the present speak for themselves; Stuttgart is the sixth largest German city with the highest 
migrant proportional population (40 percent), but has the lowest migrant unemployment rate 
and the lowest crime rates.571 
As examined in the earlier economics section, research indicates that there is possible 
association between recession and high unemployment to increased xenophobic attitudes. 
Likewise, in improved economic periods with lower rates of unemployment, xenophobic 
attitudes decrease and society is more socially amendable to inclusion. These factors in 
combination with Germans’ propensity towards citizens being ‘useful’ can tip the scale to the 
left or right (politically speaking) in majority society’s attitudes towards migrant integration 
efforts and programs. For migrant minorities, the opposite holds true. The less accepting the 
majority population is, the more the migrant minority may seek allegiance and acceptance 
through an alternative authority or parallel society. 
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Stuttgart regards education and training as critical for its Pact for Integration to be 
effective. As detailed previously, the city’s long-term mandate is to raise educational 
achievement among all migrant youth, increase access to universities, and re- train migrant 
adults for needed skills in city industry. A plethora of programs by the city are designed to 
leverage the skills migrants possess from their previous lives. Stuttgart’s unemployment rate 
among migrants is the lowest of all German metropolitan cities and is testament to the 
importance that education, training, and labor market entry act as a driver to migrant 
integration.572 
Strong points of Stuttgart’s efforts towards migrant integration include the majority of 
policies, programs, and outreach forums implemented under the Pact or Integration. The 
current pact’s policy efforts are refinements to individual city policies since the 1970s, but also 
gain efficiency from support by overarching German federal policy such as in the National 
Integration Plan. Stuttgart’s migrant integration programs overall have been very successful as 
evidenced in the city’s vibrant community diversity, low unemployment rates, and especially 
low crime rates, particularly when compared to both Germany nationwide and greater Europe. 
Weak points in Stuttgart’s efforts are less widespread, though limitations exist in the areas of 
affordable housing, municipal government employment diversity (goal to increase migration 
background city employees from 10 to 40 percent), and increasing cooperation with Muslim 
minority communities. 
Strong points of Stuttgart’s efforts towards migrant integration include the majority of 
policies, programs, and outreach forums implemented under the Pact or Integration. The 
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current pact’s policy efforts are refinements to individual city policies since the 1970s, but also 
gain efficiency from support by overarching German federal policy such as in the National 
Integration Plan. Stuttgart’s migrant integration programs overall have been very successful as 
evidenced in the city’s vibrant community diversity, low unemployment rates, and especially 
low crime rates, particularly when compared to both Germany nationwide and greater Europe. 
Weak points in Stuttgart’s efforts are less widespread, though limitations exist in the areas of 
affordable housing, municipal government employment diversity (goal to increase migration 
background city employees from 10 to 40 percent), and increasing cooperation with Muslim 
minority communities. 
In closing, Stuttgart is noteworthy when compared across other European cities for 
instituting successful inclusive policies to its migration background population. An emphasis 
by the Stuttgart’s mayor’s office to integrating migrants began more than thirty years ago under 
Stuttgart native Mayor Manfred Rommel (son of famed ‘Desert Fox’ Erwin Rommel), who for 
the time period took a very liberal position of integrating migrants in the city.573 Rommel’s 
upbringing in Stuttgart under American progressive policies of the Marshall Plan enabled an 
unorthodox mindset later in life as mayor Rommel challenged the status quo where migrants 
were viewed a civic burden, and instead adopted best practices that leveraged the diversity of 
the city’s human capital for commerce and social harmony. This early identification and 
acceptance by city leaders that Stuttgart would become a diverse and cosmopolitan city 
allowed for strategic planning to successfully integrate migrants and successive generation 
offspring.  
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CHAPTER 5 
A New Environment: A Framework for Migration Integration 
The 2015 to 2016 migration of people to Europe is the largest in volume since the end 
of World War II. This mass migration is dissimilar though in ethnic origins of the participants. 
People migrating are not European in ethnicity, but rather originate from the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and are predominantly Muslim. The push/pull 
drivers of the migration culminate predominantly from conflict, globalization effects, 
increasing stratification in worldwide societies, and progressively limited natural resources in 
origin nations. Crisis migrant numbers are not slowing or stabilizing; instead the magnitude 
and velocity of the migration is growing at a proportional rate to the volatility in the MENA 
region. Social convergence between residents of Europe and newly established migrants in this 
environment become a friction point for potential conflict and societal unrest. Extrapolating 
the current migration rate suggests that more than a million migrants a year are to continue 
settling in Europe; what remains unclear is whether migrant integration becomes a tipping 
point to further unraveling of stability in the European Union. 
European social and economic stability is crucial to the United States given that many 
of the nations are key allies and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
alliance. Implications of European migrant non-integration are varied but can include: crime 
and terrorism resulting from stratification of society; increasing cost to a state’s economy in 
responding to the aforesaid risks; and limited security funds being redirected into domestic 
programs. Additionally, Europe’s security funds being redirected into domestic programs 
demography crisis, where aging populations in combination with continued negative 
replacement birth rates, puts the region on a path that will challenge the sustainability of its 
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social welfare programs. MENA Muslim migrant families with higher birth rates are regarded 
by policy makers as diametrically opposite in being both economic salvation to maturing 
European economies, but also a societal risk requiring long-term integration efforts and 
evolution to the majority society’s identity and values. 
The European Union was founded to prevent future wars on the continent through 
creation of a supranational European identity and economic aspects of shared industries (coal 
and steel originally), open borders, free commerce, and common values. The migration crisis 
of the modem era risks fracturing this alliance though as political divisions between countries 
become more acute, open borders of the Schengen passport- free zone are at ever greater risk, 
and far-right political parties gain further prominence throughout Europe. The shifting 
European political environment has the potential to result in regressive (protectionist) 
immigration policies that further alienate, rather than integrate, migrants and successive 
generation offspring. 
This final chapter seeks to compare and contrast the two different local approaches 
undertaken to migrant integration between Paris (colonial legacy; assimilationist approach) 
and Stuttgart (federalist model; multiculturalist approach) in the post-World War II timeframe. 
The goal of this comparison is two-fold. First is to understand why some nation states were 
more successful than others in integrating migrants to their native populations. Second is to 
identify key drivers that most contribute to successful integration between existing 
communities and newly settled refugees. In sum, the end state is to understand what was done 
well, what was not done well, and what can be learned from these events to plan for current 
and future migrant integration efforts across the larger European region. 
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Comparing Factors of Identity 
Societal acceptance within Paris and Stuttgart of individuals with a migration 
background is starkly different. In Paris, migrants and subsequent generation individuals live 
at the periphery of society in ghettoized banlieues (suburbs). In this environment they are 
effectively second-class citizens cut-off from Parisian society by lack of connective 
infrastructure and ostracized ethnic cultures. In contrast, Stuttgart adopted an unorthodox 
vision of inclusionary policies more than 30 years ago that leveraged human capital of migrants 
for the advancement of the city. This mindset established early-on an equal footing between 
majority and minority society. Today, Stuttgart is a model city for migrant integration where 
roughly one-third of the population was born abroad but is also socially and equally accepted 
by the other two thirds in public life, in the workplace, and in school.574 
Evidence based from case study research indicates that an individual’s identity is built 
from environments of either inclusion or exclusion. Individuals not accepted by majority 
society are by default excluded and at risk to social isolation. Research indicates that socially 
isolated individuals are at a greater risk to succumbing to criminal or deviant pursuits, 
forming/joining parallel societies with alternate social norms and values, or at worse becoming 
radicalized with potential intent to harm majority society. 
Preventing Residential Segregation 
The contrast between Paris and Stuttgart is most obvious in residential segregation 
practices where Paris’ banlieues formed (non-interventionist) compared to Stuttgart’s active 
quota system designed to forge diverse communities. Many banlieues and associated housing 
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projects were originally designed and built to be self-supportive and symbiotic between 
temporary migrants and the industries they supported. This included housing projects built 
with their own segregated schools, shopping areas, and transportation (not public 
infrastructure) between the community and industry locations. The arrangement was 
satisfactory to Paris of the 1970s as the recruited temporary migrants were necessary to 
building the economy, but were not readily welcome socially in the city center. Unfortunately 
for Paris, temporary migrants became permanent residents over time, industries moved or went 
bankrupt, and yet the banlieues and housing projects remained - still cut off physically and 
socially, but now lacking a purpose. 
It should be no surprise that as banlieue migrant populations became idle through 
unemployment or lacking other ready means of social mobility through education or industry 
re-training, that crime and social unrest became synonymous to the public image of banlieues. 
Banlieue riots in the 1980s and afterward through the 2000s stereotyped migrant origin 
individuals as first simply non-white (perceived as criminal) second-class citizens, but later 
post-9/11 being more negatively connoted as non-white Muslims and/or criminal youth 
(perceived as radicalized). Paris took no proactive measures to dissuade the formation or 
entrenching of ghettoized banlieues, but rather adopted aggressive police measures that were 
more reactionary. In sum, the current segregated banlieue fosters an ethnic mobility trap, which 
incentivizes residents to remain within their own peripheral community, values, and social 
norms. Otherwise by description this creates conditions for parallel societies at odds with Paris. 
Stuttgart by contrast took a very different approach post-1970s. Rather than relegate 
guest workers to the outskirts of society, the city instead began adopting quota policies and 
methods from the 1980s onwards to integrate different ethnic migrants into various 
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communities scattered around the city. This was codified in policy by 2001 in Stuttgart’s Pact 
for Integration where no more than 20 percent of a community’s population could be from 
countries external to the European Union.575 This best practice physically made Stuttgart the 
diverse cosmopolitan city that it is today. More importantly, by physically diversifying 
boroughs with migrant and non-migrant peoples it prevented peripheral ghettoization and 
ensured all city residents equal access to public spaces, transportation, government, and public 
schools. Stuttgart’s successful approach is evidenced by it having the lowest crime rate of all 
metropolitan cities in Germany, unemployment among migrant origin individuals and 
successive generations being markedly lower than any other Germany city, and a thriving 
center for small business enterprises founded and run by migrants and their children.576 
The lesson to be realized from a comparison between segregation practices in Paris and 
Stuttgart, is that Government intervention can mitigate segregation and its negative effects to 
migrant integration. Stuttgart’s specific method of mandating percentage quotas to certain 
neighborhoods based on ethnicity (being of non-European origin) may not be universally 
applicable by environment or context, but a policy end state goal of achieving diversified and 
cosmopolitan communities apparently is sound. Finally, a municipal intent of ensuring all 
citizens equal social standing and access to goods and services is seemingly equivalent to social 
inclusion and begins with associated housing policies toward migrants. 
Access to Equal Rights to Reduce Discrimination 
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Neither Paris nor Stuttgart is completely immune to discrimination and racism. 
Discrimination exists in both cities, but as directed towards migration background individuals 
the pervasiveness varies. In Paris, banlieues magnify and reinforce discrimination between 
majority society and migrant origin individuals. The two primary culprits to this effect are first 
from aggressive state policing generally targeting banlieue crime, but more specifically 
evidenced in migrant origin youth (profiling). The community at large experiences the second 
and third order effects of this strategy with heavier police presence utilizing more aggressive 
tactics. The second culprit is an increased Islamophobia of the last fifteen years as best 
demonstrated by the public debate surrounding wear of the Muslim female headscarf (hijab). 
Banlieues have large populations of MENA Muslims and thus make an easy target for anti-
Muslim public sentiment. 
Discrimination in the workplace is reported as pervasive in France, but proving as much 
is difficult given France’s equality laws barring any compiling of statistics by race or 
ethnicity. 577  Lacking a feedback loop creates a quandary for a country founded on the 
principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Having no legal means to track or correct social 
(discrimination) attitudes over time and place associates equal rights in France to having no 
real importance and likely to change only at the same pace as the associative majority cultural 
norm of the environment. 
Comparatively Stuttgart after the 1970s is distinct in having low rates of reported 
discrimination. Stuttgart’s high proportional population of migrants (38.5 percent) residing in 
mixed communities give it a distinct edge, but the city’s real advantage is in its tactic of 
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increasing intercultural collaboration and dialogue through forums, shared experiences, and 
diverse communities. 578  Stuttgart’s Forum of Cultures best illustrates this by being 
representative to intercultural dialogue between 62 member organizations collectively 
representing 50 nations.579 
In short, diverse populations with access to equal rights deter migrant and subsequent 
generation alienation, isolation, and radicalization. Also, it is not enough to have sound policy 
in combination with diverse populations, but rather that intercultural dialogue, activity, and 
collaboration is necessary. Activity is what creates experience and intercultural understanding 
over time. Lastly, a bottom-up feedback loop is necessary so that changes over time can be 
quantitatively measured to gauge and/or give credence to minority discrimination. 
Islamic Identity in France and Germany 
There are similarities between France and Germany in regards to Europeanized Islam. 
Muslims in Europe are not heterogeneous and range from being not religious at all to 
alternatively ultra conservative in both countries. Despite a resurgence of Islam among second 
and third generation migration background individuals, most studies show the majority of 
Muslims being less religious with each successive generation, which matches European 
majority societies. 580  Despite this, new ethnic identities are formed by majority society 
‘pushing’ migrant origin individuals into negatively stereotyped Muslim caricatures, while 
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simultaneously the aforementioned post-9/11 resurgence in Islam pulls to it migrant youth and 
other disaffected individuals. For example, prior to 9/11, Turkish and Algerian origin 
individuals were respectively referred to as Turk and Beur; now they are known simply as 
Muslim. Ostracized from European society and identity, Muslims youths in France and 
Germany progressively resist the mundane orthodox mosques of their parents and instead 
gravitate towards neoteric nonconformist imams who post sermons in local languages 
online.581 
Civic communication, cooperation, and collaboration with Islamic faith organizations 
is the most direct method to influencing this religious social space and steering youth away 
from radical associations. National overarching laws governing state involvement differ 
distinctly though between France and Germany. The French laïcité form of secularism is quite 
literal and rigid when compared with Germany’s constitution (Basic Law) which is more 
religious neutral. In practice, one can compare the French sanctioned council of Islamic 
organizations (French Council for the Muslim Faith) against the stated funded and affiliated 
German Islamic Conference or alternatively Stuttgart’s ‘Roundtable of Religions’. 
In the case of France, laïcité law provides no legal standing for the representative 
French Council for the Muslim faith or more importantly any state funding. Lack of state 
financial support in combination with a public (Muslim or otherwise) suspicious of any French 
‘involvement’ (otherwise strictly secular) to a religious organization diminishes potential 
popular support of the French Muslim public. Lastly, because of the evolving nature and 
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heterogeneity of Muslim faith in France the council is not wholly representative of all Muslims 
in France and Paris. 
Conversely, Germany’s Basic Law is not so rigidly secular and provides a state-
religious neutral space for dialogue and cooperative support (financial and otherwise). The 
German Islamic Conference at the national level and Stuttgart’s ‘Roundtable of Religions’ at 
the local level are emblematic of this arrangement wherein the religious associations and state 
interact and support one another without an aura of public distrust. This allows for wider 
respectability, representation, and involvement by Germany’s and Stuttgart’s Muslim 
communities. 
The lesson learned in comparing Muslim faith and associated organizations within 
Paris and Stuttgart shows that strict secularity can act as a wedge between state and citizen 
either in the aspects of religion or discrimination. Germany’s model shows that legally 
protected and supported shared space increases collaborative dialogue, reduces illegitimate 
religious behaviors, and reduces minority ostracism. Adversely, France’s model is one in 
which Islam is pushed further to the social periphery with no state guidance, oversight, or 
cooperation. 
Deterring Radicalization 
Incubators of radicalization are an accompanying by-product of the aforementioned 
resurgence in European Islam. Ultra-conservative Muslim sects such as the Salafi movement 
operate outside the mainstream of French and German society and make the most gains within 
migration background communities in radicalizing at risk youth or other marginalized 
individuals - into devoted followers. In France, prisons are the primary culprit, while in 
Germany it is underground mosques. 
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Government efforts mitigating radicalization are varied between Paris and Stuttgart. In 
general, one could compare contrary efforts where Paris’ takes a singularly reactive stance to 
combating radicalization by aggressive policing targeted to higher crime minority ethnic 
dominate areas (banlieue). Stuttgart’s anti-radicalization program ‘A Safe and Clean Stuttgart 
conversely is multi-faceted by partnering police with citizen associations in tell separate target 
areas of: fostering positive social politics as a preventative measure; safety partnership 
covering all areas of life and population groups; children’s safety; the Pact or Integration; 
prevention through sport; preventing against and fighting juvenile delinquency; traffic safety 
in public areas; public transport safety; safety and cleanliness; and preventing crime and urban 
development.582 
Between the two, Stuttgart represents a successful approach as evidenced by the lack 
of Muslim or other extremist ideological attacks. Stuttgart’s approach was singularly unique 
by focusing on the underlying conditions that breed Muslim Islamist tendencies such as 
preventing poverty and segregation in tandem with youth programs that offer meaningful 
alternative activities rather than criminal pursuits. Stuttgart’s ‘Safe and Clean’ program also 
works in tandem with other city religious outreach efforts such as ‘Intercultural opening up 
and qualification of mosque associations in Stuttgart’ and ongoing collaboration between 
police and mosques. The lesson gleaned in comparing Paris and Stuttgart’s anti-radicalization 
efforts is that while radicalization is difficult to predict or completely avert, preventive 
programs involving all actors of the community enable shared vested interest in lessening the 
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effects of parallel societies developing (such as in prisons and underground mosques) and 
mitigating at risk migrant youth becoming further alienated. 
Comparing Migrant Integration Policy 
At the policy (structural) level, France and Germany have two different philosophies 
in how best to integrate migrants into majority society. Both countries’ outlook is informed by 
history. In respect to France, its colonialism (assimilation) outlook persisted in the post-World 
War II era and centralized French republic assimilationist policies remained the status quo. 
Germany comparatively was not a victor of World War II; as such, American derived policies 
under the Marshall Plan in combination with a new federalist constitution (Basic Law) 
determined decentralized federalism (pluralist multiculturalism) the best method of 
governance moving forward in the post-World War II period. Against the backdrop of 
competing ideologies in how to best integrate migrants (assimilationist versus multiculturalist), 
temporary guest workers immigrated to both countries on a massive scale with a majority 
remaining thereafter. In comparing the two countries’ migrant integration record in light of 
these policy foundations, the lesson to note is that strict assimilationist policies do not have a 
good track record for integrating foreigners to majority society, while integration models and 
multiculturalist models do.583 
Policy formulation and strategic analysis differ between France and Germany. French 
Interior Ministry’s Office for Integration, Reception, and Citizenship (Direction de l ‘accueil, 
de l ‘integration, et de la citoyennete, or DAIC) migrant integration policies only cover the 
first five years after arrival and generally only include limited language training, country 
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orientation, and partial social welfare for support and access to employment.584 Following the 
first five years, all migrants and successive generations’ integration support is ‘mainstreamed’ 
to being under general social policy and addressed by the Agency for Social Cohesion and 
Equal Opportunity (l’Agence pour lei cohesion socicale et l ‘egalite des chances, or Acse) 
within the Paris City Ministry. 585  Regardless, even if France did redirect policy support 
following a migrant’s first five years, it would still need to track migrants through a visa status 
or database as laïcité laws preclude policy focus by race or ethnicity. French policy design 
additionally does not allow for flexibility at local levels; municipalities are forced to augment 
national integration policy rather than simply adjust. This results in unnecessary and redundant 
legislation and funding. In contrast to France, Germany’s National Integration Plan (NIP) 
breaks new ground in best practices by being systemically (integrated from national to local 
levels) designed, decentralized and flexible to empower all levels of government, and 
specifically targeted not only to newly arrived migrants but also successive generations. 
Policy implementation between the two countries likewise differ. French policy 
execution is top-down and centralized. Germany’s is decentralized (federalist) being both top-
down executed, but also with autonomy at the local state and city levels (bottom-up). When 
comparing the two different models, migrant integration policy works best as a combination 
of top-down and bottom-up to account for variables that fluctuate by context and environment. 
In this sense, local cities need autonomy to craft and implement policies that make the most 
sense while also having the support and vertical integration of the nation state. In comparing 
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the two local case studies, Paris is glaringly deficient having no specific policies targeted to 
migrant integration after the first five years, let alone for second and third generation migration 
background individuals. Stuttgart on the other hand, strategically designed and implemented 
the Pact or Integration as a long-term comprehensive effort to harness benefits from migrant 
integration and ethnic diversity. The pact’s design relies on partnering with the private sector, 
non-governmental actors, and community associations while also leveraging the clout and 
resources of Germany’s NIP. Stuttgart’s efforts and its Pact or Integration (established 2001) 
are well recognized by policy experts as a benchmark in integration best practices as 
exemplified by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) awarding Stuttgart its ‘Cities for Peace Prize’ in 2004 and shortly after the Council 
of Europe adopting a majority of the pact for inclusion to its official policy to migrant 
integration. 
Comparing Factors of Economics in Migrant Integration 
National and local economic conditions weigh on the probability for success of migrant 
integration. Three factors to take particular note of are demography (macro labor market 
requirements), state of the economy, and unemployment. Economics overall provides the 
foundational environment for the other factors (identity, policy, and education) actions and a 
migrant’s milieu. Demography and long-term labor market supply is one area that France is in 
an advantageous position when compared to Germany and which in some ways explains the 
Franco-strategic mindset regarding (or little regarding) migrant integration efforts. Whereas 
Germany struggles to replace its population and hence provides a ready long-term labor pool 
for its economy with a low birthrate of 1.5 children per family on average - France has been 
much more successful in maintaining positive birthrates (above 2 children per family) after 
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World War II under Gaullist (former President Charles de Gaulle) inspired social family 
policies.586 This is principally due to France putting a priority on enacting costly though 
effective - policies supportive to motherhood and childcare rather than a similar focus 
immigration and migrant integration policies.587 Germany instead focused on closing the birth 
rate gap through immigration. This is one possible explanation at the strategic level as to why 
Germany puts a higher national priority (and funding) on immigration policy, while France 
comparatively does the same in respect to social policy for financial support to families. 
In ideal circumstances Germany would not resort to relying so heavily on immigration 
to augment its native birthrate. Comprehensive migrant integration policy is costly over the 
long-term and only begins to pay for itself and contribute to the overall economy when 
migrants become productive in the labor market over a sustained period. Three policy courses 
of action are generally available to a nation state in this case. The first option is the best where 
native birth rates are increased through targeted social policy to families (e.g. France). The 
lesser second option is a blended model where immigrants are targeted by education, skills, 
and/or trades in coordination with social policy to increase native birth rates. The last option 
is the least ideal wherein a country accepts migrants without any targeting towards education 
or skills and also without adaptation of social policy to increase native birthrates. Germany’s 
demographic model lies between the second and third options, as its native population is 
resistant to an increase in native birth rates after even after minor targeted social policy to 
families. 
                                                             
586 Steven Philip Kramer, “Baby Gap: How to Boost Birthrates and Avoid Demographic Decline,” 
Foreign Affairs 91, no. 3 (May/June 2012), 2-4. Note that 1 .5 children per German family is 
referenced from 2012 prior to the most recent refugee influx from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
587 Ibid.  
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State of the economy and unemployment rates in respect to migrant integration efforts 
are other factors to consider. Generally speaking, in times of recession and higher 
unemployment societies are less pluralistic and inclusive to foreigners. This translates to higher 
rates of xenophobia, added discrimination against ethnic minorities, and overall acts as a 
headwind against social integration of migration background individuals. For reference, 
compare environmental conditions between the banlieues of Paris and city of Stuttgart. During 
the turbulent rioting of 2005, youth unemployment in Paris banlieues was an incredible 40 
percent.588 Paris banlieues are historically known for high unemployment among migrants, so 
this was not necessarily outside the norm though still surprising when only looking at one 
specific segment of the population. Conversely consider Stuttgart’s 2007’s unemployment rate 
for non-German foreigners at 11.4 percent, which though seemingly high was actually lower 
than other major German metropolitan areas and remains so currently.589 The take-away is that 
despite Germany and France both needing varying amounts of labor augmentation from 
immigration (Germany more so than France), their state of economy sets the conditions to how 
well migrant integration can occur. 
Education as Acculturation 
Whereas an area’s state of economy determines environmental conditions, education is 
the decisive point to migrant integration as school, accreditation, and training enable an 
individuals’ access to the labor market and social inability from low skill trades up to the 
                                                             
588 Economist, France’s Riots: An underclass rebellion, November 10, 2005, 1, accessed January 13, 
2017, http://www.economist.com/node/5135795/print 
589 Doris Luken-Klaben, Diversity Policy in Employment and Service Provision – Case Study: 
Stuttgart, Germany (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2009), 8, accessed January 21, 2017, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.cu/sites/defualt/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef0917en_5.pdf 
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professional ranks. Comparatively, Paris and Stuttgart are polar opposites in strategic vision 
regarding migrant education and training as an acculturating influence. The two cities focused 
on different targets - Paris on ‘special education areas’ (e.g. banlieues) inhabitants vice 
migrants and successive generation offspring, and Stuttgart exclusively on newly arriving 
migrants and migration background individuals. 
Paris did not heed the lessons learned from turning Peasants into Frenchmen as 
succinctly established by author Eugen Weber.590 In Paris, education as a state controlled 
acculturation tool is non-existent outside of language training to migrants in their first five 
years of arrival to France; post-five years and for successive generations of migrants, education 
policy is crafted, funded, and directed by income levels regardless of race or ethnicity. At a 
structural level this equates to legacy social downgrading of migrants as first generation 
arrivals are first handicapped in the basic skills necessary (e.g. native language competence, 
vocational training and credentialing) for entry to employment fields with upward mobility. 
Next, deficiencies in labor skills and educational attainment are passed to successive 
generation migrant children, as first generation parents did not themselves master the native 
French language nor have life experience wherewithal needed to emphasize education to their 
children. 
Stuttgart, in contrast, regards education and training as the cornerstone of success to its 
Pact for Integration. Stuttgart’s long-term mission statement is to raise educational 
achievement among all migrant youth, increase mission to universities, and ensure migrant 
adults are trained in the skills needed to support city industry. For example, vocational training 
                                                             
590 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976), 95-373. 
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programs partnered with industry are not negatively perceived as they are in Paris; rather it is 
an effective method for turning migrants into middle skill specialists. The success of Stuttgart’s 
Pact or Integration, as exemplified in its unemployment rate among migrants being the lowest 
of all German cities, is a testament to the importance that education, training, and labor market 
entry act as a driver to migrant integration.591 
The lesson to be garnered is the distinct importance education and training have as both 
an acculturating influence for migrant integration and increasing social mobility. Paris’ 
inattention to educating and training successive generation migrant origin individuals reduces 
opportunities for upward social mobility, while also increasing the likelihood of continued 
existence in banlieues as second-class citizens. Contrasted to this, Stuttgart’s Pact or 
Integration puts a substantial focus on educating both new and established migrant origin 
individuals, thus enabling migrants to better themselves and overall society and economy. 
A Framework for Successful Migrant Integration 
The comparative case study research demonstrates six key drivers contribute to 
successful migrant integration: the policy model (integration/multiculturalism); equal rights 
and religious protections mandated by law; strategic integration policy (comprehensive at 
national to local levels); intercultural collaborative space; education and training; and 
residential diversity policy. The ultimate culmination of these key drivers and associative 
effects is a new environment achieved that is symbiotic between the majority and minority 
(migrant origin) society. The three constructive elements -key drivers, effects of key drivers, 
and new environment - represent a potential framework for successful migrant integration. The 
                                                             
591 “Employment: Monthly Publication,” Federal Statistical Office and the statistical Offices of the 
Lander; Department of Integration, A Pact for Integration: The Stuttgart Experience, 20. Reference 
table 4.2 earlier in the chapter. 
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basis for the key drivers is the fundamentals most responsible for the successful experiences, 
events, and systems as derived from the two case studies in Paris and Stuttgart. The effects of 
the key drivers are based from lessons learned and best practices from the two case studies. 
Finally, the new environment depicts a combination of the best environmental factors of both 
cases that best relates to sustained social and economic stability. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Framework for Successful Migrant Integration.592 
 
Key drivers are the foundational elements to the framework as they determine and 
sustain the intended effects and new environment. The first key driver is the policy model 
utilized - i.e. assimilation, integration (blend), or multiculturalism.593 Lessons learned indicate 
that utilizing either an integration or multiculturalist model is most effective to decreasing 
                                                             
592 Framework developed by author from findings of research. 
593 Reference chapter two’s figure 2.2 ‘Variation in migrant integration strategies.’ 
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factors of discrimination and diversity over time. The second key driver of equal rights and 
religious protections mandated by law builds off the first. The intent of this driver is to ensure 
a level playing field for all individuals in the society. Third is strategic integration policy that 
is both comprehensive and vertically integrated from the national to local levels. The intent of 
this key driver is simply that the region or nation state has dedicated the requisite planning, 
resources, and manpower to achieve migrant integration over the long-term. Fourth is 
intercultural collaborative space. As discussed earlier having legitimate neutral space provides 
the impetus intercultural/interreligious communication, cooperation, and collaboration. The 
fifth key driver is education and training. This driver is critical to ensuring migrants have the 
education and skills necessary to be viable citizens in the economy. The final key driver is 
residential diversity policy. The intent of this driver is to prevent ethnic segregation in 
communities and formation of ghettos. As Stuttgart’s example shows diversified communities 
are a synergetic acculturating force. 
The second building block of the framework following the key drivers is the associative 
effects as evidenced in the two case studies. All noted effects are influenced by all key drivers, 
but some effects are decisively linked to certain key drivers. The first effect is equal access to 
public goods and services, which is a result contingent on all individuals having equal rights 
under law. The second effect is public accountability with a feedback loop quantifying changes 
over time. In terms of migration background individuals, the target of accountability is 
reducing discrimination in public, governmental, and workplace spheres. These effects are also 
directly linked to the key driver of equal rights and religious protections mandated by law. The 
third effect is state controlled framework for acculturation, which is decisively influenced by 
the two key drivers of strategic integration policy and education and training (i.e. state 
157 
mandated curriculum). Fourth is migrant skills attained for the labor market with the by-
product of upward mobility. This effect is contingent on the key driver of education and 
training. Fifth is having an open and legitimate forum for intercultural dialogue, which is 
related to the key drivers of intercultural collaborative space, policy model influences, and 
equal rights and religious protections. The final effect is achieving diversified communities 
from the key driver of residential diversity policy. 
The culmination of the key drivers and effects is a new environment achieved, which 
is self-reinforcing and symbiotic. New environmental goals are to achieve cultural assimilation 
in the second and third generations of migrants. 594  In tandem with this is sustaining the 
progress and efficiency of the key drivers and effects to mitigate unintended by-products such 
as segmented assimilation. Next is community intercultural/interreligious tolerance through 
communication, cooperation, and collaboration. Intercultural space, dialogue, and experience 
over time equate to achieving environments of tolerance and accord. The final new 
environmental condition is that of achieving migrant social mobility with an upward trend. 
Social integration does not occur easily; rather it requires years if not entire generations 
to achieve. Migrants’ social mobility increases proportional to affluence, so too does 
intercultural/interreligious tolerance, and acceptance of majority society cultural norms 
(cultural assimilation). The framework described entails a long-term commitment of resources 
to achieving cultural assimilation of migrants in the second and third generations; however, 
                                                             
594 Cultural assimilation dictates that both majority and minority cultural norms shift and evolve to 
finding a middle ground in social norms and values. Hence, cultural assimilation of migrants by the 
second and third generation likely entails that a majority culture with different attributes, norms, and 
values than when the first generation migration arrived to the host nation.  
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this is a small relative cost in order to leverage for the betterment of society the human capital 
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